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Abstract
Modern railways are required to operate with a high level of safety and reliability.
The weakest components are those which have the highest safety requirements and
the lowest inherent reliability. Single-throw mechanical actuators, such as powered
train doors, trainstops, level crossing barriers and switch actuators (point machines)
are a group of components which have these properties.
Preventative maintenance is carried out periodically in order to mitigate the risks of
these actuators failing. This is ineﬃcient: a condition-based maintenance approach
would reduce costs and the risks to staﬀ. However, this kind of maintenance
requires very accurate automatic condition monitoring. Currently, the threshold-
based condition monitoring systems installed in pilot schemes around the country do
not have enough insight into actuator performance to detect incipient faults. These
are hard to spot because their symptoms develop over a long period of time.
It is uneconomical to carry out detailed analysis or modelling, or collect a large
amount of training data, for each instance of a large group of assets. Therefore,
the solution needed to establish diagnosis rules based on oine analysis, or training
data from only one actuator.
This thesis draws on previous work in qualitative trend analysis to build a diagnosis
system which uses a combined approach of qualitative and quantitative analysis to
transfer the knowledge gathered from one actuator to its fellows in service. The
method used has been designed to use straightforward components, so that it can
be more easily explained to users.
Two case studies were carried out in order to verify the system's functions. Data
were collected from real-life actuators, under simulation of incipient faults. The
diagnosis system then operated on the data. The system's performance was almost
as good with real-world data as it was with synthetic data.
The system has been a success when operating on the data gathered under laboratory
conditions. In the real world, a system such as this could be used to post-process
data gathered around the railway network from actuators with local data acquisition
equipment. Incipient faults could be detected in the early stages of their development
and accurately diagnosed, allowing maintenance eﬀort to be targeted very speciﬁcally,
saving money, time and exposing staﬀ to fewer hazards.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Railway actuators and reliability
There are several key applications in the railway industry which require reliable, fail-
safe mechanical actuators. These include barriers for level crossings, train doors,
trainstops and point machines (also known as switch actuators). Each of these
applications is safety-critical, so the actuators are designed to fail to a safe position.
This often means that an actuator failure causes delays to train services, because
it is often impossible for trains to run under the degraded conditions created by a
safe or `right-side' failure. During busy periods, one short delay can often have a
greatly detrimental eﬀect to the punctuality of following services and thereby incur
ﬁnancial penalties for train operators and the infrastructure organisation.
Recent accidents at Potters Bar (2002) and Grayrigg (2007) were caused by `wrong
side' actuator failures, where the equipment does not fail to a safe position. The
consequences of such failures are much worse than right-side failures; one passenger
perished at Grayrigg, whilst at Potters Bar, a total of seven deaths occurred (six
passengers and one passer-by, who was killed by falling debris). In the case of
the Potters Bar accident, the infrastructure owner and the former infrastructure
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maintainer jointly accepted ﬁnancial liability for the accident [1]. The total value
of compensation claims is expected to reach several million pounds.
There are, therefore, two incentives for the rail industry to develop a means of
detecting faults in actuators before they actually fail:
∙ To minimise right-side failures and thereby keep the railway running smoothly
∙ To minimise wrong-side failures and thereby avoid injury and loss of life
By achieving these two goals, the rail industry avoids ﬁnancial penalties, loss of
reputation and the possibility of prosecution for negligence.
1.2 Current maintenance practice on the railways
1.2.1 Prediction of faults
There are three types of fault which can aﬀect railway actuators:
Abrupt - a fault whose symptoms manifest themselves suddenly; in an actuator,
the fault can appear after many thousands of apparently fault-free operations
Intermittent - a fault whose symptoms are not always observable; they tend to
appear for a few operations and then disappear, making them diﬃcult to
isolate
Incipient - a fault which develops gradually over a period of time, with its symptoms
gradually becoming stronger
Abrupt faults are diﬃcult to predict, because an actuator can be observed to be
working perfectly during one operation, and then to fail completely the next time it
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is operated. Intermittent faults are similarly diﬃcult to predict, because there are
no indicators as to when the fault will appear.
Incipient faults, however, can be predicted with some accuracy, providing the correct
parameters of the actuator are observed for every operation. The development of
an incipient fault is shown in ﬁgure 1.1, where successive measurements have been
plotted as an adjustment fault was gradually introduced on a HW switch actuator.
The waveforms have been coloured from green to red according to how severe the
fault was at the time - green plots are from early in the development of the fault,
and red plots are later in the development. The reddest waveform corresponds to
the maximum severity of the fault which still allows the actuator to complete its
operation.
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Figure 1.1: Progressive introduction of an adjustment fault into a HW switch
actuator
1.2.2 Condition monitoring and diagnosis
When a failure occurs on a railway actuator, the standard practice is for a technician
to examine the failed item and use a series of observations to determine the fault.
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The technician uses his or her senses of sight and hearing to check for unusual
operation, and relies on experience and training to diagnose the fault.
In the case of intermittent faults, this method is unreliable because there is usually
a period of time between a failure being reported and the technician examining the
actuator. An intermittent fault may have only manifested itself for a few operations
and then disappeared, so that when the technician examines the actuator, no fault
is found. This wastes time and money, and can expose technicians to risk if they
have to work in a dangerous environment (for example, an open railway line where
trains are running) in order to carry out the examination.
In response to the clear limitations of a diagnosis approach based on human
observations alone, several pilot systems for remote condition monitoring have been
introduced on the UK rail network. These systems consist of an array of sensors, a
data acquisition device and a communications link to a base station [2]. This allows
the actuator to be monitored continuously.
Some incipient faults have been successfully predicted and diagnosed using simple
techniques such as triggering alarms when a threshold in a parameter is reached.
However, thresholds have a limited use, because sometimes a parameter may take
an extreme value as part of normal operation, and thereby breach a threshold when
there is no fault present. This creates false alarms which hold up railway operation
and reduce the conﬁdence maintainers have in the condition monitoring system.
Thresholds must also be tuned to the individual performance of an actuator. This
requires lengthy setup times with technicians on site. The ambient temperature at
the asset site can have considerable eﬀects on any values measured, for example an
asset might work perfectly when adjusted on a spring day of 15∘C, but move into a
failure mode on a very hot summer's day of 30∘C. Equally, the eﬀects of temperature
may manifest themselves in measured waveforms as trends away from the normal
fault-free data (which would look like a failure mode) but the asset may still be in
working order.
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Condition monitoring is, for the most part, incorporated in the periodic maintenance
regime, which shall be discussed further in the next section.
1.2.3 Preventative maintenance
Right-side actuator failures can, as has already been mentioned, have a big impact
on the performance of a railway system. The risk of right-side failure is currently
mitigated by a regime of periodic preventative maintenance. Certain components
are replaced or maintained at ﬁxed time intervals. For the majority of actuators on
the railway network, it is during such maintenance tasks that the condition of the
actuator can be ascertained by the maintainer.
The success of preventative maintenance depends on the determination of the correct
maintenance interval for each component. If the interval is too large, the risk of
failure becomes unacceptable. If the interval is too small, the regime becomes
uneconomical. Other risks are also increased if maintenance occurs too often: for
lineside equipment, personnel must work in a potentially dangerous area, increasing
the risk of accidents; also, there is a greater risk that the intervention may itself
cause a fault to develop.
1.3 The design problem
1.3.1 Deﬁnitions
This thesis is concerned with the detection and diagnosis of faults and, thereby,
the prediction of failures. Faults can be deﬁned as a deviation between perfect
performance and complete failure [3]. By this deﬁnition, then, a piece of equipment
may still be able to function with a fault present, but the fault will degrade its
performance to a certain degree. A failure occurs when the fault is so severe that
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the equipment is no longer able to function. For example, if a rail switch actuator
experiences increased friction because the slide chairs on the switch are ingrained
with dirt, then that is always a fault, but it only becomes a failure when the friction
is so great that the actuator is unable to drive the switch from one side to the other.
The thesis focuses on monitoring a particular class of device, known as single-throw
mechanical equipment (STME). STME has two stable positions but transitions (or
throws) between the two positions occur in a non-periodic manner. STME usually
has a large, non-linear load. The throw time (time taken to move from one stable
position to the other) is therefore relatively long and this means that the dynamics
of the equipment as a whole are of a comparable timescale to the throw time, unlike
electrical switchgear, where the transition occurs much faster [4].
1.3.2 Conclusions from current practice
Section 1.1 leads to a conclusion that there must be a better method of maintaining
actuators, where the condition of the actuator determines whether intervention is
necessary, rather than a ﬁxed interval of time. This is known as condition-based
maintenance.
Condition-based maintenance relies on accurate and comprehensive condition
monitoring. Human examination lacks the insight into actuator operation necessary
to predict all known faults, and the current methods of remote automatic condition
monitoring have potential for improvement, through the development of more
sophisticated approaches for analysing the data which is monitored.
Page 6 of 189
1.3.3 Proposal for improvement of remote condition
monitoring
Currently, remote condition monitoring for railway actuators consists mostly of
diagnosis of abrupt faults and the measurement of key parameters for subsequent
time-consuming analysis by trained personnel.
It is proposed that an improvement could be made to this system by automating the
monitoring of key parameters, with the aim of detecting incipient faults in the early
stages of development, and triggering alarms so that maintenance can be scheduled
before the incipient fault develops to the stage where it can cause a failure.
This would improve the reliability of the railways by reducing the number of failures
which occur during normal traﬃc time. There is also potential to improve safety,
because wrong-side incipient faults can be detected using the same system. Setup
times for monitoring equipment would be reduced because the system would tune
itself to the individual performance of actuators.
1.4 Systems engineering approach
Systems engineering is emerging in industry as an eﬀective approach for the
development of complex products. The IEEE deﬁnes systems engineering, in its
standard [5], as :
...an integrated approach to product development, which represents
the total technical eﬀort for the following:
∙ Understanding the environments and the related conditions in which
the product may be utilised and for which the product should be
designed to accommodate
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∙ Deﬁning product requirements in terms of functional and
performance requirements, quality factors, usability, producibility,
supportability, safety, and environmental impacts
∙ Deﬁning the life cycle processes for manufacturing, test,
distribution, support, training, and disposal, which are necessary
to provide life cycle support for products
Depending on the product to be developed, the tasks performed in systems
engineering will vary widely, but most system engineering approaches have in
common a top-down approach (starting by viewing the system and its performance
as a whole), a consideration of the life-cycle of the product, a signiﬁcant eﬀort to
correctly deﬁne the initial requirements, and an interdisciplinary approach to the
achievement of solutions [6].
In a research project, systems engineering activities can be used to structure the
deﬁnition of requirements and the evaluation of previous methods, with a view to
novel application or inspiration of an original solution. Although this is an unusual
approach for a doctoral research thesis, it was appropriate for the problem posed.
Since the problem posed to the author is highly practical and industrial in nature,
it was appropriate to use a design approach which is compatible with industrial
needs and implementations. However, the author recognises that research does
not produce the best possible results if conﬁned within a dogmatic, linear process.
Systems engineering has been used in this thesis to help understand the requirements
and provide a logical framework for the thought process, but, in practice, considerable
freedom has been exercised during the process of the research. The design process
is explained in more detail in appendix A.
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1.5 Structure of the thesis
The structure of the remaining chapters of the thesis is outlined below.
Chapter 2 - Requirements Analysis
A set of initial requirements were extracted from the brieﬁng document. These
requirements were decomposed into single, testable statements so that each could be
tested separately. The resulting set of requirements was used to direct the research
and helped deﬁne the shape of the solution.
Chapter 3 - Method research and evaluation
A comprehensive literature review was carried out in three main sections: ﬁrst, a
general survey of fault diagnosis; second, fault diagnosis as speciﬁcally applied to
the railways; and third, a review of a series of papers proposing diagnosis methods
for a benchmark actuator. The conclusions of this review led to the formation of
some generalisations for the structure and operation of railway condition monitoring.
Several approaches from the literature search were evaluated in more detail and
measured against the requirements.
Chapter 4 - Functional Design
The system to be designed was ﬁrst represented as a black box, executing the
function required with given inputs and outputs. A decomposition was carried out,
resulting in a functional representation for each part of the system, at the lowest
possible level. This design was then expressed in terms of mathematical functions.
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Chapter 5 - Case study I: Pneumatic door actuator
The ﬁrst case study was carried out on pneumatic actuators for swing-plug train
doors. Two faults were simulated on each door of a single vehicle of a class 158
diesel multiple-unit. Pressure and displacement were recorded. The system was
able to detect and diagnose the gradual introduction of the faults, but behaved less
reliably when the fault eﬀects were proportionally smaller, compared to the general
scale of the measured waveforms. One notable feature of this case study is that each
actuator was in a very similar setting - because all four doors were identical. The
author gratefully acknowledges the cooperation of South West Trains in this case
study.
Chapter 6 - Case study II: HW switch actuator
The second case study examined faults on HW switch actuators, used throughout
the UK rail network. Several faults were simulated on switches at two Network
Rail training schools. Data were recorded as faults were gradually introduced. The
results were positive and show a clear ability to detect the onset of faults at an
early stage of development. The data in this case study were more challenging to
the system and identiﬁed some weak points for further work. In contrast to case
study I, the actuators were installed with varying loads, making the diagnosis task
more diﬃcult. The author gratefully acknowledges the cooperation of Network Rail
in this case study.
Chapter 7 - Conclusions
In this section, the results of the case studies are critically reviewed. It is fair to
conclude that the system performs its required function and is very sensitive to the
early onset of faults. It cannot be used on its own, however, and would be ideal as
Page 10 of 189
a plug-in to a larger fault diagnosis system. Further work needs to focus on making
diagnosis more accurate, and, in particular, achieving a higher quality of qualitative
trend analysis.
Appendix A - Details of the design process
The systems engineering approach was formalised into distinct phases, each of which
is represented by a ﬂow diagram. Systems engineering requires iteration, which was
incorporated into each phase as required. Phase I was the collection of requirements
and initial literature search. Phase II was the functional deﬁnition of the system
according to the requirements. The system was implemented in phase III and tested
and veriﬁed in phase IV.
Appendix B - Mathematical notation
Some mathematical notation conventions were adapted to represent certain concepts
within this thesis. This enabled simple representation of subsets of matrices and
element-wise numerical operations.
Appendix C - Results graphs from case study I
The complete output of the system from case study I is plotted here in graphs of
the fault strength against severity of the simulated fault.
Appendix D - Results graphs from case study II
The complete output of the system from case study II is plotted here in graphs of
the fault strength against severity of the simulated fault.
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1.5.1 Extra-curricular work
In addition to the two case studies included in the thesis, some work has been
carried out using the system developed. The INNOTRACK European project for
innovative track systems includes a sub-project based on condition monitoring for
switch systems. As part of this work, fault simulations were carried out on an AC
switch actuator. There is limited scope to test the system with data from only one
actuator, but this instance was more relevant to the requirements of the European
partners. The results of the use of the system developed here were included in
INNOTRACK deliverable 3.3.4 along with much of the method evaluation presented
here.
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Chapter 2
Requirements analysis
2.1 Initial requirements
The ﬁrst stage of requirements analysis is to extract an initial set of originating
requirements from appropriate source documents. For this thesis, there is a single
pertinent source document which is the thesis brief [7]. The text of this document has
been used (in modiﬁed form agreed with the thesis supervisor) to form a single, top-
level requirement from which all others shall be drawn. This top-level requirement
is quoted below:
The thesis shall develop a novel, intuitive and straightforward method
for the detection and diagnosis of faults in actuators (Single-Throw
Mechanical Equipment). A selection of railway case studies shall be
used to demonstrate the generic nature of the methodology developed
and the applicability of widespread usage. The actuators which could
be used are listed below:
∙ Westinghouse M63 electric railway switch actuator
∙ ALSTOM HW electric railway switch actuator
Page 13 of 189
∙ Smiths Industries Clamp Lock hydraulic railway switch actuator
∙ Various brands of London Underground electro-pneumatic
trainstop
∙ Vapor-Stone pneumatic train door actuator
∙ Vapor-Stone electric train door actuator
A practical implementation, which can be deployed on the railway
for demonstration, is desirable, but a suﬃciently rigorous lab-based
demonstration of the functioning system shall be considered suﬃcient
to prove the concept. In either case, the system shall incorporate a
suitable interface to the user for the operation of the machine and the
presentation of the results.
2.2 Requirement decomposition
The top-level requirement clearly states what the thesis is to deliver. The purpose
of requirements decomposition is to transform this large requirement into a set
of individual testable statements which deﬁne in more detail what the thesis is
to achieve [6]. These statements can then be used as a benchmark to assess the
success of the resulting system. Domain knowledge can be an additional input to
this process, as it inﬂuences the structure of the decomposition and the text of the
resulting requirements.
The following requirements were derived from the top-level requirement:
1. A system shall be developed to detect and correctly diagnose present and/or
emerging faults. The scope of this function shall be limited to faults which
can be reliably simulated on a working actuator.
2. A doctoral thesis shall be submitted to the University of Birmingham,
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containing an account of the design process, the method developed, and the
results of implementation. The submission shall be made no later than 25th
September 2009 (in order to comply with regulations from the funding source,
the EPSRC).
3. The method developed shall be demonstrated to solve the design problem
by constructing a system in software, testing it with simulated inputs (from
measurements made elsewhere) or measurements from a lab-based actuator,
and recording the results. The simulated inputs shall have diverse sources,
in order to show that the system implements a generic algorithm. If a
practical implementation is pursued, this requirement shall still be fulﬁlled
as a simulation step.
4. The method developed shall be demonstrated to solve the design problem by
constructing a system in physical form, deploying it on live actuators and
recording the results. The actuators used shall be diverse in nature, in order
to show that the system implements a generic algorithm.
5. The system shall possess a signiﬁcant measure of novelty. This could be in the
form of new methods developed to fulﬁl certain system functions or a novel
implementation of existing methods.
6. The system shall be able to perform its speciﬁed function for at least 3 types
of actuator from the following set:
∙ Electric railway switch actuators e.g. Westinghouse M63, Alstom HW,
Siemens S700 series
∙ Smiths Industries Clamp Lock hydraulic railway switch actuator
∙ Electro-pneumatic trainstop
∙ Pneumatic train door actuators e.g. Vapor-Stone, Kiekert
∙ Electric train door actuators e.g. IFE, Faiveley
∙ Level crossing barriers
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7. The system shall perform its speciﬁed function using a method which can easily
be explained to a qualiﬁed Signalling and Telecommunications maintenance
technician.
8. The system shall be able to perform its speciﬁed function on multiple instances
of the same actuator type, which may be installed in diverse situations, with
varying loads and environmental conditions.
9. The system shall incorporate an interface which shall allow the user to interact
eﬀectively with it.
10. The system shall be suitably interfaced to its environment and the machine
under test. If a practical implementation is pursued, consideration shall
be given to railway regulations regarding the acceptance of equipment for
use on or near the line. For both practical and lab-based implementations,
consideration shall be given to local health and safety requirements.
These top-level requirements can then be decomposed further to result in a set of
single, testable statements.
1. A system shall be developed to detect and correctly diagnose present and/or
emerging faults with an adequate level of accuracy. The scope of this function
shall be limited to faults which can be reliably simulated on a working actuator.
1.1 A system shall be developed to detect and diagnose emerging faults in
STME actuators.
1.2 The system shall detect faults with an adequate level of accuracy to avoid
false alarms.
1.3 Faults shall only be considered for diagnosis if they can be reliably
simulated on a working actuator.
1.4 The list of faults to be diagnosed for each actuator type shall be agreed
after consultation with maintainers.
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2. A doctoral thesis shall be submitted to the University of Birmingham,
containing an account of the design process, the method developed, and the
results of implementation. The submission shall be made no later than 25th
September 2009 (in order to comply with regulations from the funding source,
the EPSRC).
2.1 A doctoral thesis shall be submitted to the University of Birmingham.
2.2 The thesis shall be submitted no later than 25th September 2008.
2.3 The content of the thesis shall include an account of the design process, a
description of the method developed, and the results of implementation.
3. The method developed shall be demonstrated to solve the design problem by
constructing a system in software, feeding it with simulated inputs (from
measurements made elsewhere) or measurements from a lab-based actuator,
and recording the results. The simulated inputs shall have diverse sources,
in order to show that the system implements a generic algorithm. If a
practical implementation is pursued, this requirement shall still be fulﬁlled as
a simulation step.
3.1 The method developed to solve the problem shall be delivered as a
theoretical, software-based implementation.
3.2 The software implementation shall operate on data sets from several
diﬀerent actuator types.
4. The method developed shall be demonstrated to solve the design problem by
constructing a system in physical form, deploying it on live actuators and
recording the results. The actuators used shall be diverse in nature, in order
to show that the system implements a generic algorithm.
4.1 (Optional) - The method developed shall be delivered as a practical
implementation.
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4.2 (Optional) - The practical implementation shall be suitable for
deployment on an operational railway.
4.3 (Optional) - The practical implementation shall operate on diverse types
of actuator.
Items 5-10: no decomposition required.
These requirements are now suﬃciently decomposed that they may be used for
testing the system which is developed.
2.3 Impact on the system design
By deﬁning the requirements fully at the start of the design process, many possible
options for implementing the system can be excluded with a minimum of eﬀort if
they do not fulﬁl the requirements. This speeds up the process of developing a
method for solving the design problem.
2.4 Test speciﬁcations
The test speciﬁcations for the system are based on the requirements in section 2.
In order for testing to be successful, each of the performance requirements must be
shown to have been fulﬁlled.
Table 2.1 shows the test speciﬁcations referenced to the performance requirements.
Page 18 of 189
Req.
No.
Spec.
No.
Test speciﬁcation
1.1 1 The trend gradient for fault 푓푖 must be positive when 푓푖 is
simulated (Detection)
1.1/1.2 2 The trend gradient for 푓푖 must be greater than all other
gradients when 푓푖 is simulated (Diagnosis)
Table 2.1: Requirements and test speciﬁcations
The term trend gradient refers to the gradient of a ﬁrst-order linear trend constructed by least-
squares approximation from the fault membership values paired with the corresponding fault severity
ﬁgure. This severity ﬁgure shall be quantiﬁed separately for each fault; it may be a measurement
which indicates the severity, or simply the number or magnitude of adjustments made to simulate
the fault.
Page 19 of 189
Chapter 3
Method research and evaluation
The set of requirements formed in section 2 exerts a substantial amount of constraint
over the type of system which is to be developed. However, fault diagnosis in general
is a huge ﬁeld with large numbers of diﬀerent possible approaches, and many versions
thereof.
In this chapter, published literature on fault diagnosis shall ﬁrst be reviewed. Then,
a selection of approaches shall be examined in greater detail and evaluated against
the requirements for this thesis.
3.1 Literature review
3.1.1 Background
Automated fault diagnosis has been an area of high research activity for several
decades. Most of the eﬀort in this ﬁeld has been focussed on industrial processes,
such as may be found in the chemical and manufacturing industries. Industrial
processes usually have dozens or hundreds of variables and a large, expensive plant
which is built as a one-oﬀ exercise. This means that investment in fault diagnosis
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has been higher, because it is a proportionally smaller cost to the operators and yet
yields a high return in increased reliability.
The diagnosis of actuators, on the other hand, has not been the subject of as much
research eﬀort. Within a large process environment, the failure of a single actuator
is unlikely to bring the process to a halt, because redundancy is built in to such
a system. The plant diagnostic system identiﬁes an actuator as causing a problem
but does not seem to go into any further detail.
The nature of railways is such that failures of actuators can very often lead to a
system halt whilst remedial action is carried out. Train door failures cause delays
because of the safety procedures that are followed. For example, certain types of rail
vehicle cannot be used if a single door is out of action, because they are passenger
emergency exits and must always be available. Failed switch actuators cannot be
used to throw points, therefore they limit the control a signaller has over the routing
of trains.
3.1.2 Layout of the literature review
Section 3.1.3 is a review of diverse diagnosis methods which have been implemented
across many diﬀerent ﬁelds of engineering. A review will then be included of
articles which are concerned with actuator diagnosis in particular. This consists
of two main parts: an overview of the previous research carried out into railway
actuator fault diagnosis (section 3.1.5), and then a review of methods developed for
the DAMADICS1 actuator problem (section 3.1.4), where several groups developed
solutions for a valve actuator in a sugar factory.
1Development and Application of Methods for Actuator Diagnosis in Industrial Control Systems
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3.1.3 Diverse methods for fault diagnosis
Figure 3.1 shows a categorisation of methods for fault diagnosis. The diagram has
been reproduced from a review paper [8], with the addition of automata to the
class of qualitative causal models. There are three main categories of fault diagnosis
methods: qualitative model-based, quantitative model-based, and process history-
based.
Diagnostic 
methods
Quantitative 
model-based
Qualitative 
model-based
Process 
history-based
Observers
Parity space
Extended 
Kalman Filter 
(EKF)
Causal 
models
Abstraction 
hierarchy
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Fault trees
Qualitative 
physics
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Functional
Qualitative
Expert 
systems
Qualitative 
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(QTA)
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Neural 
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Statistical
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component 
analysis
Statistical 
classifiers
Automata
Figure 3.1: Categorisation of methods for fault detection and diagnosis [8]
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Figure 3.2: General structure of a quantitative model-based method for fault
diagnosis
Quantitative model-based methods
The basic concept of these methods for fault diagnosis is to establish a mathematical
model of the plant to be diagnosed, using a functional structure such as that shown
in ﬁgure 3.2. This model then predicts the values of the plant's measurable variables.
Signals known as residuals are generated by comparing the predicted variables to
those measured from the plant itself. These residuals can then be used to determine
if any faults are present, and what they might be. The most common functions for
residual generation are subtraction of the model signal from the measured signal (to
detect additive faults) and division of the measured signal by the model signal (to
detect multiplicative faults).
Many methods exist for modelling the performance of dynamic systems, but the
dominant form of model in the ﬁeld of fault diagnosis is the state-space input-
output model [8], usually in discrete form because variables are measured on a
sampled basis.
One advantage of such a model is that it quite often exists already in the controller
of a large piece of plant. State-space models are used to estimate the state variables
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of a system when they cannot be readily measured directly. This model is known
as an observer and is used to provide more insight into a system's operation and
therefore enable it to be better controlled. Mathematical models of this type have
been used for some time for various applications including servo motors [9] and jet
engines [10, 11].
Parity equations (or relations) are another widely-used method of obtaining residuals.
These are essentially a rearrangement of the state-space input-output model which
result in a parity vector whose values are ideally zero when no fault is present. The
parity vector is then monitored for change which would indicate the presence of a
fault. It is generated in such a way as to make it dependent only on faults introduced
to the system and not on the system's state itself [12].
Höﬂing and Isermann [13] used parity equations to form a fault detection system
which tracked the parameters of the monitored system. Parity equations can be
used for parameter estimation. By tracking changes in parameters, faults can be
detected and diagnosed.
Gertler and Monajemy [14] used dynamic parity relations to generate directional
residuals, meaning that the introduction of a particular fault moves the residuals in
a straight line through the parity space (the vector space made up of the residual
signals). A desirable property of some such systems is that the movement of the
residuals is orthogonal for each diﬀerent fault, and therefore diagnosis is very simple.
This method is similar in outcome to the use of observers or extended Kalman Filters
tuned to each fault [15], but Gertler and Monajemy claim that their method makes
the design process simpler.
Ballé and Füssel [16] proposed a solution to the problem of modelling non-linear
systems by viewing them as piecewise linear and constructing a LOcal LInear
MOdel Tree (LOLIMOT). This is a structure of linear models which are each valid
for a certain part of the system's operation. This method was tested on a control
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valve actuator of the type used in chemical processes.
Another non-linear modelling solution was proposed by Demetriou and Polycarpou
[17]. This used online approximators to model the performance of non-linear systems
from a precise mathematical model. When the output of an online approximator is
non-zero then a fault is detected. This system can also diagnose the characteristics
of faults and can be designed to be robust to modelling errors.
Qualitative model-based methods
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Figure 3.3: General structure of a qualitative model-based method for fault diagnosis
There are three main reasons cited in published literature for pursuing the use of
a qualitative model. The ﬁrst is that modelling inaccuracies are not a problem
because qualitative methods do not rely on exact numerical modelling. The second
is that qualitative methods can be used where it is not possible to make quantitative
observations. The third is that qualitative models make it possible to incorporate
empirical knowledge about a system in the operational model [18]. Figure 3.3 shows
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the functional ﬂow of a generic qualitative model-based diagnosis system: it will be
seen that there are some similarities with the structure of a quantitative model-based
system.
A number of papers concerned with qualitative modelling and its application in
fault diagnosis have been published by Professor Jan Lunze of the Ruhr-Universität
Bochum, Germany, and various associates. There has been particular focus on
the use of non-deterministic (or stochastic) automata as a modelling medium for
physical processes [19]. Automata are also known as state machines. Stochastic
automata were applied to the observation of qualitative states [20] and the diagnosis
of transient faults [21]. A study was also carried out into the conditions which must
exist for a deterministic automaton model to be valid [22], and the use of a semi-
Markov process model, as a timed description of quantised event sequences, was
evaluated [23]. State machines are also used as a qualitative model by Ramkumar
et al [24].
These papers all deal with situations where variables cannot be directly measured
and so a qualitative model must be used to process the qualitative variables which
can be measured. The methods involve a partition or quantisation of the measurement
space so that a discrete-event representation can be constructed.
Various probabilistic methods then model the transition between states and produce
a diagnosis output. A probability level is calculated for each possible fault, which is
a useful output because it allows a human observer to see the increasing probability
that a certain fault is present over a period of time, and also can show how one fault
initially appears more likely, but then diminishes as time goes on.
These methods are eﬀective but there is always a compromise when quantised data
is used as an input to a model. The probabilistic diagnosis algorithms are in place
to deal with the ambiguity introduced by the use of these data. Quantisation also
means that small changes in measured variables are not always detected straight
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away. This means that incipient faults may not be detected quickly enough.
Digraphs, also known as cause-eﬀect graphs or signed directed graphs (SDG), were
proposed by Iri et al [25] as a means of qualitatively simulating the performance
of a physical system. The diﬀerential equations which mathematically represent a
system were transformed to qualitative graphs by considering only the sign of each
value (positive, negative or zero).
Digraphs can be used to represent a qualitative causal model, as part of a system
to predict faults in a gas turbine [18]. Users of this system were able to view
raw data, model behaviour using standard quantitative equations, and add further
qualitative information from knowledge by editing the resulting digraphs. Tarifa and
Scenna [26] applied digraphs to chemical processes, using a propane evaporator as
an example. A fuzzy logic rule base was then used to diagnose faults according to a
knowledge base established during the simulation of faults. Fuzzy logic is concerned
with the formal principles of approximate reasoning, with precise reasoning viewed
as a limiting case [27]. In fault diagnosis, this allows us to determine the degree
of presence of a fault condition: that is, the level of conﬁdence we have that the
condition is currently present.
Qualitative physics is intended as a means for artiﬁcial intelligence systems to make
reasoned decisions about the real world, based not only on standard mathematical
behaviour models but also human-style deductions. A basic qualitative physics was
proposed by de Kleer and Brown for perturbation analysis [28]. The limitations of
this approach then led to the development by de Kleer and Brown of a more complete
physics based on conﬂuences [29] and also to the development of qualitative process
theory by Forbus [28].
Fault trees are knowledge-based models which relate symptoms to particular fault
conditions. They are used to determine the likely behaviour of equipment under
failure modes. Heuristic knowledge and human reasoning are used to link observable
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Figure 3.4: Fault tree diagnosis
symptoms to fault conditions. Providing there are enough symptoms to observe
and that each fault has a unique set of symptoms, it is possible to diagnose faults
accurately. Fault trees can be derived from digraph models [30] to form a diagnosis
system for chemical processes. This approach was designed to include operator
actions and disturbances from outside the plant. Figure 3.4 shows the functional
ﬂow of a generic fault tree diagnosis system.
Abstraction hierarchies are schemes for fault diagnosis where the end result is an
isolation of the component or function which is faulty [31]. The decomposition of
a system, according to the functions performed within it, has been proposed [32].
This allows the system state to be deduced qualitatively, leading to the isolation of
the faulty component or subsystem.
Hierarchical schemes are suitable for large monitored plants such as the chemical
processes which were being considered in these papers, however this thesis is
concerned with the diagnosis of faults in a single actuator, and so the scale of
these methods is not appropriate.
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Process history-based methods
History-based methods are fundamentally diﬀerent from model-based diagnosis meth-
ods because no prior knowledge about the monitored system is required. Previously
measured data from the system is analysed to produce some knowledge from it
which can be used to diagnose faults. This function is known as feature extraction
[33]. Methods for the application of the knowledge are much the same as those for
model-based methods.
There are several categories of feature extraction methods. These are shown in
the process history branch of ﬁgure 3.1. Quantitative feature extraction can be
statistical or non-statistical. Statistical methods are concerned with ﬁnding patterns
in abstract mathematical representations of data.
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is one of the most recent of these represent-
ations and has been applied to face recognition [34, 35] and non-destructive testing
of metal objects for sub-surface cracks [36]. PCA is a mathematical transformation
of vector or matrix data which reduces the dimensionality of the data.
Wavelet transforms are mathematical representations of signals with components in
both the frequency and time domains. They have been used for feature extraction
in many diﬀerent ﬁelds including fault prediction for ball bearings [37], classiﬁcation
of geographical data [38, 39], classiﬁcation of NMR2 spectra [40], wear estimation
for industrial turning processes [41] and vibration monitoring [42].
Wavelet transforms are a function of a signal, two scaling variables 푎 and 푏, and a
mother wavelet which is a mathematical function with zero mean and ﬁnite length.
The scaling variables allow the wavelet transform to be carried out at various scales,
which can produce a multi-resolution analysis of the signal.
Frequency-domain analysis has been used for some years to extract the features
2Nuclear Magnetic Resonance
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of signals for diagnosis. Fourier transforms in particular can be used to track
components of certain frequencies.
All these statistical methods rely on complex mathematical functions and produce
fairly abstract data which requires further interpretation before it can be of use.
The complexity of the functions limits their use on this thesis, where it has been
speciﬁed that the methods used must be transparent and understandable to the
technical staﬀ who would be expected to use the system.
Some initial work was carried out into the possible use of wavelet transforms as
a means of representing the waveforms from diﬀerent actuators in some common
domain, but it was found that the performance of each actuator produced results
which could not be reliably linked in any qualitative way.
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Figure 3.5: An example of a diagnosis system using ANNs to model the monitored
equipment, and to recognise faults through patterns in the residuals
Artiﬁcial neural networks (ANNs) are very popular computing methods which have
applications throughout engineering. Their basic operation is modelled on that of
neurons in the human body, which have input and output components and a vast
amount of interconnection [43]. Figure 3.5 shows the functional ﬂow of a neural
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network-based diagnosis system, where ANNs are used both for the diagnosis of
fault from symptoms, and for the prediction of the outputs of the monitored asset.
They are capable of learning from input data and performing functions such as
modelling of data proﬁles (which can be used to replace conventional mathematical
models) and the classiﬁcation of patterns (which can be the diagnosis of faults from
an initial set of observed residuals generated by a model of any kind) [43].
Because of their versatility, ANNs of many diﬀerent types have been employed in
fault diagnosis research in recent times. A set of training data is all that is needed
to program them to model systems and diagnose faults with superior accuracy to
most other methods. Some examples of previous applications are catalytic cracking
processes [44], power transformers [45] and robotic arm manipulators [46].
ANNs have the advantage, from the view of this thesis, of requiring no detailed
analysis of the monitored systems, but rather a set of data which can be used to
teach the network (training data). Training data can sometimes be easier or less
costly to obtain than an accurate and detailed mathematical and physical analysis of
an asset. However, the very nature of ANNs is black-box, in that it is impossible to
observe how a neural network arrives at a particular decision. It is very important
in this thesis that the decisions can be traced right back to their origins so that
technician users can interact fully with the system and draw their own conclusions
from its output. Therefore, ANNs are not suitable for this thesis.
Qualitative process history-based methods attempt to solve the problem in non-
numerical ways. Two diverse types of qualitative method based on process history
are Qualitative Trend Analysis (QTA) and expert systems.
Qualitative Trend Analysis describes the process of qualitatively extracting relevant
information from observations and using it to draw conclusions about the state of a
monitored system. Cheung, Bakshi and Stephanopoulos [47, 48, 49, 50] developed
a comprehensive scheme for the representation of trends in sensor data. The basic
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method was to ﬁlter the waveform to the scale required for analysis, which removed
some of the higher frequency information, and to then represent the waveform as a
series of standardised curves.
This enabled sensor data to be partitioned into a sequence of episodes, where
each episode is a trend of a particular shape. The episodes are represented by
an alphabet of curve shapes. The problem with the scheme as presented in the
sequence of papers [47, 48, 49, 50] was that the representation of the data constituted
a classiﬁcation problem, for which the authors had no ready solution but referred
to the use of neural networks and other complex methods of classiﬁcation.
This appeared to make the process very complex, but the idea of using an alphabet
of basic shapes to represent waveform data is one which appeals greatly. Some
quantitative information can be stored along with the sequence of shape characters.
The starting and ending values in each episode are one example of this. Therefore,
these representations contain both qualitative and quantitative information, making
the approach ideal for this thesis. Shortly after the start of this thesis, the author
proposed that if data were collected from many actuators of the same type and in
the same condition, it would be possible to represent the data in such a way that the
qualitative performance would be identical in all cases [51]. This can be achieved
by using QTA.
Further work on QTA suggested a partitioning approach where the measured data
were partitioned into intervals of the same length, and the qualitative state of each
partition was determined separately [52]. Figure 3.6 illustrates the basic stages of
this process.
A variation on QTA was proposed, where fuzzy rules were established for particular
episodes of behaviour identiﬁed in measured data [53]. This approach was shown to
be very successful in detecting and diagnosing faults in chemical processes. Given
that it is possible to ﬁnd a set of episodes in a qualitative representation which
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are common to all fault conditions for a given actuator, fuzzy rules established for
particular episodes could be used to great eﬀect on this thesis. The fuzzy sets
developed in this paper were of uniform size, translating to heuristic categories such
as average, large, or very small.
It is proposed that a useful development of this would be to establish episodic
fuzzy rules based on the performance of an actuator under fault conditions. The
faulty performance would be measured at the point where the fault is on the
verge of preventing the actuator from moving. The fuzzy sets established would
be constructed so as to provide a gradual increase in membership between the point
of fault free operation and the point where the fault performance is measured. Then,
as operational performance moves away from fault free and towards the fault, the
membership increases, showing increased conﬁdence that the fault is present.
Expert systems are methodical representations of human knowledge which diagnose
faults by reasoning with IF-THEN rules. This can be done manually or using one
of several expert system building tools. Their chief advantages are the ease with
which they can be developed and the transparency of their reasoning [33]. Their
chief drawbacks are that they are very speciﬁc to particular systems and are diﬃcult
to update [33].
The power distribution industry has focussed heavily on the use of expert systems
for the diagnosis of faults in components such as transformers and insulators [54].
Dissolved gas analysis from transformer oil has been used to establish a set of
diagnosis rules for the detection of faults in transformers [55]. This was found
to be very successful, with detection rates for the tested faults in excess of 90%.
Butler [54] combined an expert system engine, built using the EXSYS automated
tool, with a neural network model for the ageing of power components to form a
diagnosis system for large networks of power distribution equipment. This was then
used to ﬁnd the location, within the network, of equipment which was behaving
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abnormally due to aging. Neural networks and expert systems were also combined
for the diagnosis of steady-state faults in chemical processes [56], and for the diagnosis
of power transformers [57].
3.1.4 The DAMADICS benchmark actuator project
Background
DAMADICS (Development and Application of Methods for Actuator Diagnosis in
Industrial Control Systems) was a four-year European Commission-funded project
to establish a benchmark for the assessment of diverse fault detection and isolation
(FDI) methods [58].
The project was presented in a special edition of Control Engineering Practice.
There was an introduction paper [58], several papers presenting methods for FDI
based on the benchmark actuator, and several further papers on general fault
diagnosis and soft computing. The benchmark FDI methods will be reviewed in
this section.
The benchmark is an electro-pneumatic valve actuator used in the sugar production
process at a factory in Poland. These actuators are used throughout industry
in many diﬀerent types of process. They are spring-and-diaphragm pneumatic
control valves which regulate the ﬂow of liquids through the factory. A diagram
of the actuator is shown in ﬁgure 3.7. These actuators are mechanically and
operationally quite diﬀerent from the single-throw mechanical equipment used on
railway actuators. One key diﬀerence is that the DAMADICS actuator, being a
ﬂow regulator, can have many diﬀerent positions in normal operation, between its
two extremes, whereas STME moves only from one extreme position to the other
in normal operation. A similarity, however, is that the dynamics of the important
variables are, like STME, of a similar scale in time to the time taken for movement.
Page 35 of 189
DIAPHRAGM
SPRING
POSITION SENSOR
INLET OUTLET
CONTROL 
VALVE
Figure 3.7: The pneumatic control valve actuator used as a benchmark in the
DAMADICS project [58]
Qualitative reasoning and neural network diagnosis
Calado et al [59] proposed a qualitative reasoning approach with fuzzy neural
network diagnosis. The inputs to the FDI system were the rates of change of
the measured variables, normalised over the range [−1, 1]. The authors cited the
inaccuracy of numerical models as the main reason for using a qualitative model.
The model in this method simulates the process and predicts the rates of change
of the variables, in the same format as the inputs. The real measured variables are
converted to the same qualitative format and compared with the model's predictions
in a discrepancy generator. This detects whether or not a fault is present.
The discrepancies are then fed to a hierarchical fuzzy neural network which diagnoses
the fault. A fuzzy neural network is one where the neurons each have a particular
fuzzy membership function, and the output of the neuron is the value of the member-
ship function at the input value. The use of the qualitative model appears to have
limited the usefulness of this method, because it was not possible for the system to
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detect all the faults. A major reason for this was that the small eﬀects of incipient
faults were, in some cases, indistinguishable from the noise in the variables.
This method was interesting because the qualitative processing of the input and
measured variables meant that it might be possible to process data from several
diﬀerent actuators in such a way that the same rules could be used for all instances.
This is a major requirement of the thesis. However, the qualitative model appears
not to have enough functionality. It is fair to conclude that a purely qualitative
approach to diagnosis is not suﬃcient to detect the small eﬀects of incipient faults,
which are the main target of this thesis.
State machines
Timed automata (state machines) were used in the method devised by Supavatanakul
et al [60]. The actuator was modelled as a discrete event system, and the occurrence
of faults was considered as a discrete phenomenon. The model was able to distinguish
between fast and slow state transitions, so it could detect faults which aﬀected the
time taken for the actuator to perform its function. The discrete-event model was
proposed as an alternative to standard quantitative models which was more robust
to imprecision and uncertainty, and less complex.
The ﬁrst function of this system was concerned with identifying the ﬂow of states
from measurements taken during simulations. A separate automaton was construc-
ted for each fault. The input and output model values were then obtained. Sequences
of extended states are determined, and then the possible active states were found.
The automata which did not ﬁt the possible state sequences were excluded from the
candidate set. The remaining automata represented the faults which were possible.
The method was tested against the DAMADICS benchmark by applying it to data
measured over about 100 seconds, where a particular fault occurred. The method
was able to distinguish the fault which had occurred from three other actuator
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conditions: two faults and the fault free condition. However, it was not made
clear whether the method was capable of distinguishing the other faults in the
DAMADICS data set.
Interval observer model
A novel model-based method was used by Puig et al [61]. It aimed to tackle model
uncertainties, parameter diﬀerences and disturbances by making the diagnosis stage
robust to such unwanted inputs. The model consists of observers which predict the
outputs of the plant to be within certain intervals. These intervals allow uncertainty
to propagate into the residuals, so that the input to the fault detection function
takes account of the uncertainty in the system. As with all model-based methods,
there is the disadvantage of high mathematical complexity.
The modelling of uncertainty as an interval means that faults with eﬀects smaller
than the interval are likely to be dismissed as uncertainty. This is, to a certain
extent, mitigated by the use of non-linear observers, which allow the use of less
conservative intervals than would be possible with linear observers. This system
was aimed at fault detection; the paper mentions that fault isolation (diagnosis) is
a subject for further work. Therefore this method has only limited relevance to this
thesis.
Neural networks for both modelling and diagnosis
Witczak et al [62] used a new type of neural network to both model the system under
observation (by performing system identiﬁcation) and diagnose faults. This neural
network is the Group Method of Data Handling network (GMDH). The bounded-
error approach was used in the design of the neural network to try and minimise
modelling uncertainty. The fault diagnosis network monitored the residuals generated
from comparison of the model to the real system, and maintained an adaptive
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threshold around the residuals to increase the sensitivity to faults. However, the
authors conceded that some faults could not be detected and diagnosed. Signiﬁcantly
this included incipient faults. It seems that incipient faults are often lost when
modelling uncertainty is taken into account, especially if a qualitative model is
used.
Neural networks take a large amount of complex calculations to establish. This was
addressed to some extent by ensuring that the most time-consuming calculations
were carried out oﬀ line before monitoring started [62], however with a large set of
identical actuators, some system identiﬁcation would need to take place every time
the system is installed on a new instance of the actuator. Programming an entire
neural network with the individual behaviour of each actuator would be prohibitive.
Frequency analysis
Model-free fault detection and diagnosis methods are relatively rare, but Previdi
and Parisini [63] proposed such a method based on a spectral estimation tool called
the Squared Coherency Function (SCF). This function produces a frequency-based
transform of the waveform. An envelope is established around the SCF of the fault-
free waveform. Diﬀerent envelopes are established for each type of fault.
Thus, the fault can be detected and part diagnosed by checking which envelopes are
violated by a faulty waveform. This method is not suitable for use in the current
thesis because it is only capable of picking up abrupt faults. Incipient faults would
not be detected until they are severe enough to breach the threshold.
Fuzzy classiﬁers
Bocaniala and Sá da Costa [64] also proposed a model-free method which uses
fuzzy classiﬁers to distinguish between faults by identifying regions within a multi-
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dimensional space (where each dimension corresponds to one measured variable)
where there is correlation between variables measured during a particular fault
simulation. Thus, if operational measurements fall within a particular region, a
fuzzy membership function for that region becomes high in value, denoting that the
actuator is in that particular state.
This method is very relevant to the current thesis because it provides a direct link
between the symptoms of a fault and the diagnosis. It was also designed with a view
to diagnosing faults at diﬀerent levels of severity, although it does not take account
of the slow development of incipient faults. The methods used to tune the fuzzy
classiﬁer are computationally expensive and would not lend themselves to use on a
large number of actuators.
Conclusions from the DAMADICS project
The DAMADICS project demonstrates the application of several very diverse meth-
ods to a common benchmark actuator. This makes it possible to judge the compar-
ative success of each method in a fair way.
The results from the application of a purely qualitative method [59] show that,
although qualitative analysis can be useful in dealing with variations, it is not
suﬃcient on its own to accurately detect the onset of incipient faults. In fact, most
of the faults in the benchmark set for DAMADICS were abrupt faults. Despite this,
it is clear that many of the methods were not suitable, for one reason or another,
for this thesis. The main disadvantages were that they would either be impractical
to adapt so that rules would apply to more than one actuator of a certain type, or
that they were incapable of detecting incipient faults.
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3.1.5 Fault diagnosis on the railways
Traditionally, the diagnosis of faults in railway equipment has been carried out, once
a failure has occurred, by technicians called to the equipment's location. According
to failure statistics from the Southern region of the British network [65], between
17 and 22% of failures on point actuators could not be traced to a particular fault
when the technicians examined them, resulting in a record stating Tested OK on
arrival, despite the fact that the actuator had failed in service and therefore a fault
was clearly present.
Clearly a human examination is not suﬃcient to detect all the possible faults in
these actuators. More insight is required into the operation of the actuator, and so
automated condition monitoring has emerged as a potential solution. Commercial
solutions focus, in the main, on diagnosing abrupt faults using large arrays of sensors
to detect faults in the positioning and locking mechanisms of the actuator being
monitored [2]. There are currently several pilot schemes operating around the UK.
Little academic research has been carried out to advance this technology, however
a number of papers have been published which aim to gain a better insight into
the dynamics of an actuator and thereby to try and detect incipient faults which
would not be seen on standard condition monitoring equipment until a failure was
absolutely imminent.
A neuro-fuzzy diagnosis approach has been proposed for the diagnosis of pneumatic
point machines, where the variables measured were ﬁrst partitioned into a small
number of regions [66]. This allowed a piecewise linear input-output model to be
used. Partitioning the operational variables in the same way, it was possible to
generate residuals which were sensitive to faults. Local nodes on each actuator were
capable of distinguishing sensor faults from actuator faults. Measured data from
actuator faults was forwarded over a network to a central processor which ran an
Adaptive Neuro-Fuzzy Inference System to diagnose the fault.
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This system is interesting because it uses a simpliﬁed model in order to reduce
complexity. However, it does not fully address the issue of tuning the rule base so
that the rules apply equally to each instance of an actuator type. In practice, this
system would have required the faults to be simulated on each actuator in order to
correctly tune the model, and that is not practical.
Neural networks have been used to model the performance of pneumatic train doors
and to diagnose faults [67]. An RBF neural network modelled the displacement
proﬁle of the door to a level of accuracy which could be predeﬁned. Complexity
of the network was reduced by ﬁltering and removing corrupt values from the data
set. Diagnosis was carried out with a Self-Organising Feature Map (SOFM) neural
network. The results published in this paper indicated that the accuracy of the
system was roughly 80%.
This system used the latest neural network technology but it is unclear how easy it
would be to implement it on a practical scale.
3.2 Conclusions from literature
Both qualitative and quantitative fault diagnosis methods, be they model-based or
not, have valuable properties. However, the problem in this thesis is to diagnose
a large set of actuators of the same type, where the qualitative behaviour of each
actuator is similar, but the quantitative behaviour is not. A new approach is required
because neither a purely qualitative nor a purely quantitative approach is likely to
succeed.
There are many problems with the use of quantitative models. The most obvious
is that real world equipment can never be modelled with 100% accuracy. Model
inaccuracies and uncertainties mean that residuals are unlikely to be solely dependent
on faults, and this can lead to spurious detection of faults.
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In previous years, the complexity of mathematical modelling has limited its use due
to the physical limitations of computer equipment in carrying out the necessary
calculations. Whilst modern computing power all but negates this disadvantage,
the complexity of such methods makes them diﬃcult for the layman to understand.
A key requirement of this thesis is that the method used must be understandable to
technical staﬀ. This is so that they can engage more with the process and thereby
gain more from its outputs.
Qualitative modelling is of particular interest in this thesis because it has the
potential to solve the problem of quantitative variation between instances of similar
actuators. It is fair to assume that all instances of a particular actuator will share
similar characteristics of performance when viewed qualitatively.
However, the results of the research carried out into qualitative modelling suggest
that the ambiguity introduced may impair the ability of a diagnosis system to detect
incipient faults at an early stage of detection. In many cases, qualitative models are
no simpler or easier to understand than quantitative ones.
Qualitative methods alone cannot detect incipient faults with an acceptable level
of accuracy, but quantitative methods will be diﬃcult to implement across a set of
actuators, each with slightly diﬀerent characteristics. A method is required which
uses a hybrid analysis to transform real-world measurements into a form where a
single set of rules can be applied to data from multiple actuators.
The use of process history to establish rules for diagnosis is appealing for this thesis,
because the reasoning behind it is totally transparent to a technical user. Data from
simulations of faults at maximum severity could be used to automatically establish
rules which apply to episodes in the measurements from monitored equipment.
These episodes could be established using qualitative trend analysis, which examines
measured waveforms in a similar way to humans, looking for shapes and changes
in those shapes. A combination of some of the methods discussed in this section,
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modiﬁed to the application in hand, seems like the best solution for fulﬁlling all the
requirements of this thesis.
A model-based approach does not tackle the problem in a similar way to a human,
whereas several process-history based methods are very intuitive. It is proposed that
the best solution to the design problem in this thesis will be to use a history-based
method with a hybrid qualitative-quantitative analysis of the prior data. This will
be used to establish a set of rules which apply equally to the performance of any
actuator of the correct type, providing that data measured from that actuator is
also represented with the same hybrid analysis.
The resulting system will therefore analyse the shape and trends in measured wave-
forms in a similar way to a human, and decide, based on knowledge of the shapes and
trends in faulty waveforms measured in the past, what faults appear to be present
in the monitored data.
3.3 Method evaluation
Several methods described in the preceding section were evaluated in detail by
representing them functionally and using this understanding to determine whether
they would fulﬁl the requirements of the thesis. The result of these evaluations
was compared against that of the author's own solution, which will be described in
chapter 4.
The methods were chosen as representatives of diﬀerent approaches to fault diagnosis.
They were evaluated against the requirements by this simple scoring system:
∙ One point awarded for each completely fulﬁlled requirement
∙ Half a point for each partially fulﬁlled requirement
∙ No points for an unfulﬁlled requirement
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Since the requirements are somewhat subjective, this scoring system is subjective
by extension, and is therefore only indicative.
The following methods were chosen for this evaluation:
(a) The method developed in this thesis, described in section 4
(b) Qualitative model-based distributed FDD [66]
(c) Nonlinear model-based fault diagnosis with automatic rule generation [16]
(d) FDD using a fuzzy qualitative model [59]
(e) FDD using timed automaton models [60]
Certain other methods were initially examined for suitability but obvious deﬁciencies
were found early on and a full evaluation was not necessary. One example of this was
a time-fuzzy Petri-net scheme [68], which failed to describe adequately the diagnosis
process.
3.3.1 Modelling of the system
The diagnosis problem was initially modelled as a single black box which produces
the required outputs given certain inputs. These inputs impose requirements on the
system, and their nature is determined by the method chosen. The black box model
is shown in ﬁgure 3.8.
3.3.2 Evaluation procedure
For the high level currently being discussed, it was considered adequate to perform
a simple set of checks to determine whether a proposed method was suitable for
implementation. The steps taken in evaluation were as follows:
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Figure 3.8: Black-box representation of the system
∙ Gain a basic understanding of the method and express it as a functional ﬂow
diagram
∙ Determine to what extent the proposed method fulﬁls the system requirements
∙ Determine what requirements the proposed method imposes on the system
∙ Evaluate the balance between the proposed method's fulﬁlment and imposition
of requirements
3.3.3 Semi-qualitative distributed fault detection and
diagnosis using a piecewise linear model
Description
The proposed method [66] takes account of the quantitative diﬀerences between
actuators of the same type by using a mix of qualitative and quantitative information
to predict the actuator's performance. The measured waveforms are considered to
be piecewise linear and can thus be partitioned and approximated to linear functions
(function 1 in ﬁgure 3.9). The partitioning instants are pre-determined.
The qualitative and quantitative data from this approximation is then used to model
the actuator's behaviour (function 4). The modelled output is compared with the
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measured output during operation, to generate residuals (function 5). These are
then used to detect and diagnose faults (functions 6 and 7).
Function 6 considers two types of residual, one of which is unaﬀected by sensor
faults. This allows it to distinguish sensor faults from actuator faults. Residuals
which indicate actuator faults are sent over a network connection to a central
processing point where a detailed diagnosis is carried out using an Adaptive Neuro-
Fuzzy Inference System (ANFIS).
Figure 3.9 shows the functional ﬂow for the proposed method.
Evaluation
This method is capable of detecting and diagnosing incipient faults, although indic-
ation has not been given as to how a fault trend is detected over a period of time.
It should be suitable for any type of STME, and the functions are fairly easy to
understand because the approach uses a qualitative analysis rather than complicated
mathematics. The mix of qualitative and quantitative modelling overcomes the
diﬀerences between actuators of the same type, making it suitable for use on large
asset base.
However, this system imposes some important requirements itself, in terms of the
data needed to make it function. The partitioning times need to be determined
before it can operate - this is not included in the method and would need to be added,
either with automatic analysis or human examination. A rule base is also required
for fault diagnosis - this would have to be manually extracted from a FMEA or built
automatically. In terms of measurement data, this system requires measurements
during run-in and operation of each asset, which is perfectly achievable.
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Figure 3.9: Fault detection and diagnosis using a piecewise linear model
Conclusion
This proposed method is the only published scheme found so far by the author which
takes account of the diﬀerences in performance between instances of actuators of the
same type. The methods used within each function are generally easy to understand
and fulﬁl the requirements. However, the proposed method requires considerable
analysis to be carried out beforehand, in order to establish rule bases for fault
diagnosis and for the partitioning of measured signals.
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These operations would need to be carried out for each type of STME to be
monitored. This makes the proposed method slightly less portable than one that
establishes its own rule bases. This does not fulﬁl the requirements of this thesis,
because it is implied that these tasks should be automated.
The general principles and architecture of this proposed method are the basis for the
author's own proposal, because the general approach is the right one to overcome
the diﬀerences between actuators of the same type.
3.3.4 Nonlinear model-based fault diagnosis with automatic
rule generation
Proposed method
The proposed method diagnoses faults using a nonlinear model and automatically-
generated fuzzy rules. It is proposed by Ballé and Füssel [16] and is based around a
nonlinear plant, namely an electro-pneumatic valve actuator similar to that used for
the DAMADICS benchmarking problem [58]. The functional ﬂow of the proposed
method is shown in ﬁgure 3.10.
Rules for fault diagnosis are automatically generated using a Self-Learning Classiﬁc-
ation Tree (SELECT) method (function 1 in ﬁgure 3.10), from data collected during
an initialisation phase i.e. before introduction to service. This means that the
system would not require any prior knowledge of fault performance and could
function using measured data only. The SELECT method was presented in an
earlier paper [69], the text of which is not readily available, although a summary
was found [16].
The problem of varying performances between diﬀerent actuators is overcome by a
system identiﬁcation function which analyses measured data from a run-in phase to
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determine the parameters of the model (function 2). This function provides sets of
parameters to a linear-parameter-varying (LPV) model (function 3). LPV models
have several sets of parameters, each of which is locally valid for a subregion of the
total input space. This means, for example, that the model parameters change for
diﬀerent time regions.
The model uses the measurements of inputs to the plant, and the previous values of
measured output and modelled output. This requires that the outputs of both the
model and the plant are fed through a time delay (function 6). The length of time
over which the previous outputs are considered depends on the current parameters
of the model.
Modelled outputs and measured outputs are used to generate symptoms of several
types (function 4). These symptoms are then used, along with the automatically
generated rules, to diagnose faults (function 5).
Evaluation
This method is capable of detecting and diagnosing incipient faults but it does not
explicitly state how trends would be detected over time. It establishes its own rule
base, so it should be capable of working on any type of actuator. The process by
which it achieves this is structured in a similar fashion to human thought, which
makes this part of the method easy to understand. However, complex mathematical
modelling is also used, so it does not completely fulﬁl the requirement to be easy to
understand.
Implementing the method on a large asset base would be diﬃcult because the rule
base would need to be subtly diﬀerent for each actuator, if it is generated using
measured data only. This would mean that it would require fault simulations to be
carried out on each monitored actuator, which is not practical. It is also not clear
whether the piecewise linear model requires some pre-determination of the limits for
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Figure 3.10: Fault diagnosis using a local linear model tree and self-learning
classiﬁcation
each piecewise segment - if it does, then this would also need to be carried out for
each asset instance individually.
Conclusion
The model-based nature of this proposed method means it can deal well with
variations in the inputs. However, it also increases system complexity.
The fact that the rule base is generated during a testing phase which requires all
faults to be simulated means that it would be very diﬃcult to implement such a
method on a large number of similar actuators, unless the rules were general enough
to apply to all instances of the actuator type. This is unlikely since the variations
between actuators in fault-free performance would probably be enough to generate
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large residuals.
3.3.5 Fault detection and diagnosis using a fuzzy qualitative
model
Proposed method
This method was developed as a means for solving the DAMADICS benchmark
problem for actuator fault detection and diagnosis [59]. The DAMADICS problem
is fully described in [58]. It is based on the diagnosis of faults in an electro-pneumatic
ﬂow control valve in a sugar factory.
The proposed method has a simple functional structure which is shown in ﬁgure 3.11.
The classical physical model of the plant, in the form of mathematical equations, is
used to generate (function 1 in ﬁgure 3.11) the parameters for a qualitative model
based on conﬂuences [29].
The subsequent functions operate on linguistic variables, which are qualitative rep-
resentations of the properties of a quantitative signal. The plant input and output
measurements are converted to linguistic variables by function 2, ready for use.
The qualitative model (function 3) is set up using the parameters generated by
function 1 and takes as its inputs the linguistic variables which represent the measured
inputs to the plant. The model predicts the nature of the linguistic variables which
represent the plant outputs.
A discrepancy generator (function 4) then compares the linguistic variables predicted
by the model with those representing the measured plant outputs.
The discrepancies, along with the linguistic representations of the measured variables,
are fed to a diagnosis block (function 5) where a neural network processes them and
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gives diagnosed faults as the output. The neural network is designed to be trained
using only a limited set of abrupt fault data, but to be able to diagnose incipient
faults by recognising their symptoms when they are only at a small magnitude.
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Figure 3.11: Fault diagnosis with a fuzzy qualitative model
Evaluation
The method was designed to deal with both abrupt and incipient faults, but it
was found to be poor at dealing with incipient faults because the development of
symptoms over a long period of time was almost indistinguishable from signal noise
[59] (section 5). Since incipient faults are the focus of this thesis, this method
does not fulﬁl the requirement for detection and diagnosis. Additionally, it requires
a detailed mathematical model for the actuator, something which may not be
available. The black-box nature of neural networks will make it diﬃcult for a user to
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understand why a particular output has been generated. The qualitative modelling
approach taken, however, would be capable of taking account of operational diﬀerences
between actuators of the same type.
Conclusion
The proposal has a straightforward functional ﬂow and should be insensitive to small
variations in operation between diﬀerent instances of the same type of actuator,
through the use of the qualitative model. However, a potentially complex mathem-
atical model is required in order to generate the qualitative model.
This method has been shown in [59] to be incapable of dealing with incipient faults,
which is a key requirement on the system to be produced in this thesis. The purely
qualitative approach of this method appears to have contributed to its downfall, and
suggests that a successful system will employ a mix of qualitative and quantitative
processing.
3.3.6 Fault detection and diagnosis using timed automaton
models
Proposed method
As part of the DAMADICS actuator benchmark diagnosis project [58], Supavatanakul
et al [60] proposed a model-based diagnosis method which simulates actuator behaviour
using timed automata. The functional ﬂow of this method is shown in ﬁgure 3.12.
During an initial training phase, faults are simulated and measurements are taken.
From these measurements, parameters for a series of automaton models are identiﬁed
(function 1 in ﬁgure 3.12). For every fault which is simulated, an automaton is
generated which models the actuator's behaviour under that fault condition.
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The automaton models operate on qualitative representations of actuator outputs,
measured during operation. These qualitative representations are obtained by dis-
cretisation (function 2). The value of the qualitative variable represents an interval
on the quantitative variable being represented.
The automaton models (function 3) generate discrete outputs. In order for comparison
to take place between the modelled and measured actuator outputs, the measured
outputs are also discretised by function 2.
The diagnosis stage compares the I/O sequences of each automaton against the I/O
sequence from the actuator. Where the sequences do not match, the automaton
generating the sequence is rejected as a potential fault candidate. At the beginning
of a time sequence, all faults are considered possible. The comparisons between
I/O sequences are made every time instant. Over a period of time, fault conditions
which are not possible are eliminated, leaving only the set of possible faults. This is
the output of the diagnosis function.
Clearly, if the set of possible faults contains only one fault, then the fault has been
diagnosed with certainty.
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Figure 3.12: Fault diagnosis using automaton models
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Evaluation
The way this method works means that incipient faults would have to reach a
signiﬁcant level of severity before the system could eliminate enough fault candidates
to give a useful diagnosis. It therefore does not fulﬁl the requirement to detect and
diagnose incipient faults. The complex modelling approach, which uses multiple
models, makes it diﬃcult to understand, as does the use of set theory for the
construction of the automata. The method could be used on more than one type of
actuator, and the use of qualitative variables would mean that small diﬀerences in
performance between instances could be accommodated by changes in the rules for
discretisation of measured variables, although this would require an extra function
which is not included.
Conclusion
This scheme is not suitable for the application being considered by the thesis,
because it makes no provision for adapting the parameters to multiple actuators
of the same type, and because it does not give as an output any indication of the
severity of a fault.
The uncertainty introduced by discretising the variables is countered by making the
set of possible faults a crisp set. However, since all members of this set have the
same value of membership (1), there is no way to completely diagnose a fault unless
the symptoms are so severe that none of the other fault candidates is valid. This is
impractical for an actuator which may appear to work perfectly for many operations
whilst an incipient fault is developing, because a diagnosis at a stage where operation
has been aﬀected, such that no fault is excluded from the set of possible faults,
would be too late to be of any use for the purposes of condition-based maintenance.
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3.3.7 Evaluation results
Fulﬁlment of system requirements
Table 3.1 shows the points scored by each method against each requirement considered
to be key to the success of the system. This table indicates that the new method
ID Method
a Solution proposed in this thesis
b Semi-qualitative distributed fault detection and diagnosis using a
piecewise linear model [66]
c Nonlinear model-based fault diagnosis with automatic rule
generation [16]
d Fault detection and diagnosis using a fuzzy qualitative model [59]
e Fault detection and diagnosis using timed automaton models [60]
Requirement Method
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Method must either be novel or be used
in a novel way
1 0 0.5 0.5 0.5
Method must successfully predict and
diagnose a reasonable number of faults
1 1 0.5 0 0.5
Method must be applicable to at least 3
diﬀerent types of actuator
1 1 1 1 1
Method must be intuitive to human
technicians
1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0
Method must be applicable to a large set
of similar actuators
1 1 0 1 1
Total score (out of possible 5) 5 3.5 3 3 2.5
Table 3.1: Table of points scored by each method against the requirements
proposed in this thesis is the one which fulﬁls most of the requirements. As standalone
schemes, the other methods do not fulﬁl all the thesis requirements, but certain
aspects of their approach, as discussed in section 3.2, have given inspiration to the
new method.
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The new method also imposes the least requirements on the system. This is intuitively
true, since it is the only one based completely on history rather than models.
It is therefore fair to conclude that the new combined approach of qualitative
trend analysis and automatic fuzzy rule generation is more suitable for fulﬁlling
the requirements of this thesis than methods which have previously been suggested.
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Chapter 4
Functional design
Functional design is the process of reﬁning the method of solving the design problem
until a solution is produced which fulﬁls all the requirements. It is independent of
the eventual implementation and therefore a functional design can be transferred
between implementation platforms. Functional design is considered to be a funda-
mental stage in the design process, allowing the method to be determined without
the distraction of concerns related to implementation (unless they are so important
that they have had an eﬀect on the requirements)[6]. This was especially important
in this thesis because it was initially proposed that there might be an opportunity
to construct an implementation suitable for ﬁeld trials on the UK rail network.
Therefore the eventual method would need to be suitable for implementation both
in the lab and out on the track.
Section 4.1 describes the process of decomposition, where the function of the system
is broken up into smaller functions until each function is simple enough to be
implemented easily. The design is graphically represented as a set of Enhanced
Functional Flow Block Diagrams, which show the functions and also the items passed
between them as inputs and outputs. Each level of decomposition generates a new,
more detailed set of diagrams.
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Section 4.2 represents the eventual functional design in terms of the mathematical
functions used.
4.1 Functional decomposition
4.1.1 Initial functional representation of the design solution
Figure 3.8 shows the initial view of the system, modelling it as a black box with
inputs to be deﬁned by the requirements of the solution developed, and outputs
which correspond to the requirements.
The solution constructed in this thesis is designed to use process history data which
is easy to obtain. This means that any fault simulation data must be collected
from an actuator which is not operational, because it would be inconvenient and
potentially dangerous to simulate faults on railway actuators which are then required
for service.
From the outset, therefore, it was considered impossible to obtain accurate history
data for all fault conditions for every operational actuator of a certain type. However,
it was considered acceptable for each operational actuator to provide some initial
training data which can be assumed to be fault-free.
These two data sets were considered to be the only available inputs for the purposes
of training the system, because it would be impractical to attempt to obtain any
more data from each individual actuator, as typically there might be thousands of
instances of any one actuator type in service. For the purposes of monitoring it
was assumed that the same variables as contained in the training data would be
available for measurement when the actuators are in operation.
Thus there are three data sets, each of which pertain to a diﬀerent situation. Three
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functions were developed to work on these data to produce a conﬁdence level for
each known fault: function 1 processes the fault simulation data and produces a
rule set; function 2 uses the fault-free data from a particular actuator to adapt the
rule set to that actuator's individual performance; function 3 processes the online
operational data and evaluates the possibility of each fault being present. A fourth
function was added to this to track the conﬁdence levels and raise alarms at an
appropriate point.
This design is the ﬁrst-level functional decomposition of the system. It is shown in
ﬁgure 4.1 in block diagram form.
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Figure 4.1: First-level functional decomposition of the solution
4.1.2 Further decomposition
Each of the four ﬁrst-level functions is complex and therefore each was decomposed
into further functional diagrams.
In order that each of the three data sets can be operated on throughout the system,
it is clear that a common format is required. Given that neither wholly quantitative
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nor wholly qualitative representation methods seem to be comprehensively infallible
for representing the way mechanical equipment behaves, it was decided that a
common representation for measured data would be based on qualitative trend
analysis. A function to construct this representation therefore appears in the second-
level diagrams as functions 1.1, 2.1 and 3.1.
Function 1 establishes a rule base and therefore the result of the representation
made in function 1.1 is used to establish rules which will show whether a certain
portion of the representation looks faulty or normal. Function 1.2 then constructs
the rule base. This arrangement is shown in ﬁgure 4.2.
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TEST ACTUATOR 
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DATA FROM TEST 
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Figure 4.2: Second-level decomposition for function 1
The representation functions are based on the previous work done in the series
of papers by Cheung, Stephanopoulos and Bakshi [47, 48, 49, 50]. The following
deﬁnitions, corresponding with the QTA process illustrated in ﬁgure 3.6, are made
for the representation of data in a combined qualitative and quantitative way:
Partition - A ﬁxed-length portion of a waveform
Episode - A number of consecutive partitions which all have the same qualitative
Page 62 of 189
state, representing a trend of a particular shape. The letters 풜-ℐ are used to
denote each diﬀerent shape.
Proﬁle - A sequence of episodes which represent a waveform of measured data.
Partitions and episodes contain start and end values, start and end times and a
qualitative state.
The quantitative portion of the representation is obtained by storing the start and
end values of the episode, and the start and end times. The resulting proﬁle will
now be called an absolute proﬁle because the quantities in it are absolute values.
In order to eliminate information which is not relevant to the scale at which analysis
of the waveforms is taking place, the raw measurements are ﬁrst ﬁltered to smooth
them. This ensures that the proﬁle is not unmanageably large, and also that the
random variations between waveforms do not make the qualitative part of the proﬁle
change from waveform to waveform. In theory, providing the monitored equipment
is in a constant state of repair, the qualitative portion of the proﬁle will not change
at all, and there will only be small, random variations in the quantitative portion.
Figure 4.3 shows how the proﬁle is constructed from the original data. The output
of function 1.1 must be reﬁned before using it to form the rule base. Episodes are
included in the formation of the rule base only if there is a similar episode in all
proﬁles. This must be the case in order that variation between fault conditions can
be correctly examined. Therefore, the ﬁrst action of function 1.2 is to extract the
common episodes from the proﬁle set created by function 1.1.
A common episode is one which occurs in each proﬁle and under every fault condition.
The algorithm for detecting common episodes is described in detail in section 4.2.
Once the common episodes have been extracted, it is possible to analyse the variations
in proﬁle values, both within a single fault condition and also between fault conditions.
In order to make the rule base applicable to all actuators of the type in question,
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Figure 4.3: Third-level decomposition for function 1.1
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the values in the common episodes are expressed as an additive variation from the
fault free values (function 1.2.2).
Functions 1.2.3 and 1.2.4 eliminate episode values which are not useful for forming
rules. There are two criteria for elimination: if a relative value is too close to the fault
free value (function 1.2.3 eliminates values which fulﬁl this criterion, by checking
the magnitude of relative values against a threshold) or if a relative value is too
close to another fault's relative value (function 1.2.4 eliminates values fulﬁlling this
criterion, by checking relative value diﬀerences between all fault conditions against
a threshold). These functions ensure that the only values which are used to form
rules are those where performance varies distinctly from the fault-free case, AND
where performance variations for each fault are easily distinguished.
The parameters for the membership functions are then calculated. The side of the
membership function closest to the fault-free case is established to be a gradual
increase between fault-free and the average value for that fault. The further side of
the function is established to decrease to 0 at a rate deﬁned by a constant. Function
1.2.5 carries this out. The third-level decomposition of function 1.2 is shown in
ﬁgure 4.4.
The level 2 decomposition of function 2 is shown in ﬁgure 4.5. Function 2 decomposes
to two subfunctions. As previously mentioned, function 2.1 is a representation
function almost identical to function 1.1. This is illustrated in ﬁgure 4.6. Function
2.2 uses the common episode locations generated in function 1 to reference the
proﬁles generated in function 2.1. This is shown in ﬁgure 4.7.
The output of function 2 is a set of common episode values for the actuator currently
being monitored. This allows operational measured data to be normalised to the
fault-free values for that particular actuator. The resulting relative values can then
be used to evaluate fault conﬁdence in function 3.
Function 3 decomposes to two functions, as shown in ﬁgure 4.8. Once again, the
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Figure 4.4: Third-level decomposition for function 1.2
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Figure 4.5: Second-level decomposition for function 2
ﬁrst of these is concerned with the semi-qualitative representation of the measured
data, but function 3.1 also uses the fault-free common episode values from function
2.2 to relativise the values from operational proﬁles. This is shown in ﬁgure 4.9.
The relative quantities are the correct input to function 3.2, which evaluates them
against the rule base to determine the presence of all possible faults by calculating
the average membership score for all quantities in all common episodes. This is
illustrated in ﬁgure 4.10. Function 4 processes the outputs of function 3 in order to
make the results more accessible to users and thereby aid decision making. Since the
system is not yet destined to be used by technicians, the interface requirements have
been interpreted to apply chieﬂy to the testing of the system. Therefore, function 4
is designed to be of use in testing and understanding the system. The decomposition
of this function is shown in ﬁgure 4.11.
The data which are used to test the system's operational performance are long
runs of fault simulations, where the fault is gradually introduced. Function 4.1
collates the outputs of function 3 for each operation, and calculates a linear trend
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Figure 4.6: Third-level decomposition for function 2.1
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Figure 4.9: Third-level decomposition for function 3.1
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Figure 4.10: Third-level decomposition for function 3.2
for the strength of each fault over the operations measured. The trend's gradient
should be strongly positive for the fault strength corresponding to the fault condition
being simulated. All other gradients should be less than that for the current
fault. Function 4.2 plots the fault strengths for each possible fault, and each fault
simulated. The trend is then superimposed on the graph.
In a practical system, a human factors assessment would be carried out to determine
exactly how the data could be presented to maintenance staﬀ in the best way to
help them make decisions.
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Figure 4.11: Second-level decomposition for function 4
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4.2 Mathematical representation of the functional
design
Some notation conventions have been used throughout this chapter. Details of these
conventions can be found in appendix B.
4.2.1 Input data processing
Let 퐴 be the set of actuators of an identical type. 퐴's members may be installed in
diﬀering situations but the actuators themselves are all of the same design. Then, in
order to diagnose faults, the diagnosis rules must ﬁrst be established qualitatively
by simulating faults on a test actuator 푎푡 ∈ 퐴. The system is then trained to
understand the individual performances of the actuators in service, 푎1 . . . 푎푛퐴 where
푛퐴 is the number of monitored actuators in set 퐴, and thereby establish quantitative
diagnosis rules for each individual actuator. Thus
퐴 = {푎푡, 푎1, . . . , 푎푛퐴} (4.1)
Actuators of type 퐴 may display faulty behaviour. Let the set 퐸 be the set of all
possible behaviours which can be seen in actuators in set 퐴. This includes normal
or fault-free behaviour. Not all of these behaviours can be reliably diagnosed using
available technology. In order to teach the system to diagnose a fault, it must ﬁrst
be simulated using 푎푡. Therefore, by prior analysis, a subset of behaviours 퐺 is
chosen, whose members fulﬁl the following criteria:
∙ Can be simulated on 푎푡
∙ Resulting behaviour diﬀers measurably1 from fault free behaviour
∙ Would cause the actuator to fail if unchecked
1Given the sensors available
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A new set 퐹 is now constructed, which shall contain behaviours which can be seen in
an operational actuator and matched to a behaviour seen on 푎푡. Fault-free behaviour
is labelled 푓0 and the faulty behaviours 푓1 . . . 푓푛퐹−1, where 푛퐹 is the number of
members of 퐹 i.e. the number of diagnosable behaviours. It follows that 퐹 shall
only contain 푓0 and 퐺.
퐹 ⊂ 퐸 (4.2)
퐹 = {푓0, 퐺} (4.3)
퐺 = {푓1, . . . , 푓푛퐹−1} (4.4)
Using the test actuator 푎푡, each of the behaviours which are members of 퐹 is
induced. For the faulty behaviours, the behaviour shall be induced at several levels
of intensity, the highest of which shall result in the actuator being on the point of
failure. The highest intensity for behaviour 푖 shall be labelled 푓푖 (100) and the lower
intensities 푓푖 (푏) where 푏 is the percentage intensity of the fault compared to 푓푖 (100).
For example, if faulty behaviour 푓2 can be simulated by the loosening of a certain
bolt, and loosening it by 6 turns causes 푎푡 to be on the point of failure, then the
resulting behaviour is 푓2 (100), and the faulty behaviour induced by loosening the
bolt only 3 turns is 푓2 (50).
Each fault simulation is carried out for 푅 repetitions. 푅 is set for each actuator type
before testing starts and shall be suitably large. During each repetition, 퐿 samples
are taken, at an interval of 푇 seconds. 퐿 may vary between repetitions, depending
on the measurement system used. It cannot be relied upon that 퐿 will be constant
throughout. The variables to be measured shall be labelled 푚푙 (푡). The number of
variables to be measured shall be written as 푛푉 . So, the measurement M for one
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repetition shall nominally have the form:
M =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
푇 푚1 (푇 ) . . . 푚푛푉 (푇 )
...
...
. . .
...
퐿푇 푚1 (퐿푇 ) . . . 푚푛푉 (퐿푇 )
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (4.5)
This assumes that the time of each sample is measured exactly. Whilst this is not
strictly true in all cases, any inaccuracies introduced by this assumption will be
negated by the much greater eﬀects of the ﬁltering process, and will in any case be
too small to aﬀect calculations based on the dynamic scale of the actuator, since at
a sampling frequency of 1 kHz, variations on time values are at least three orders of
magnitude smaller than the fastest STME dynamics.
4.2.2 Function 1 - Rule base generation
Function 1.1 - Proﬁle generation
Function 1.1.1 - Filtering
In order to make the process of qualitative representation easier, the waveforms
in M are ﬁltered to remove high-frequency content. A Gaussian ﬁlter was used
because previous work [48] suggested that this was the best ﬁlter for preserving the
time position of turning points in the data. A Gaussian ﬁlter can be approximated
satisfactorily by using repeated iterations of a windowing function (a `boxcar' ﬁlter).
Three iterations were found to be suﬃcient to ﬁlter the data adequately. The ﬁlter
width was adjusted, for each variable, to the value which gave the best performance.
Figure 4.12 shows the eﬀects of Gaussian ﬁltering on the current waveform from an
AC switch actuator.
The eﬀects of ﬁltering seem quite drastic, but the important thing to note is that the
eﬀects of fault conditions can be seen both before and after ﬁltering; the diﬀerence
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Figure 4.12: A current waveform, sampled from an AC switch actuator at 1 kHz,
before and after ﬁltering
is now there are only a few curve shapes for the system to try to spot and match,
making the process more eﬃcient.
The corresponding ﬁlter parameters are fed as arguments to a ﬁltering function
which gives as its output a vector of the same length as the input vector, allowing
direct substitution of the unﬁltered signal with the ﬁltered one without modiﬁcation
to the time series.
The ﬁlter can be expressed as the following 푧-domain input-output relation:
푌 (푧) =
1 + 푧−1 + . . .+ 푧−(푤−1)
푤
푋(푧) (4.6)
where 푌 is the output signal, 푋 is the input signal and 푤 is the the number of
samples over which the average is calculated (the width of the ﬁlter). This operation
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is carried out three times successively in order to approximate the Gaussian ﬁlter. In
the implementation platform (MATLAB R⃝), the ﬁlter is a direct form II implementation
of the standard diﬀerence equation [70].
The output of the ﬁltering process is a matrix D which has the same layout as M
but represents the ﬁltered values:
D =
[
t d1 . . . d푛푉
]
(4.7)
Function 1.1.2 - Diﬀerentiation
The next step is diﬀerentiation with respect to time. If a uniform time step length is
assumed, diﬀerentiation could be simulated by simply taking the diﬀerences between
values for each d vector (the time series for each variable), but in practice the
recorded time values must be used. The variable columns of each data matrix D
are diﬀerentiated with respect to the time column, resulting in a diﬀerential matrix
D˙. Diﬀerentiation is carried out twice, with individual diﬀerential matrices D˙⟨푖,푗⟩
and D¨⟨푖,푗⟩, deﬁned as follows:
D˙ =
[
t d˙1 . . . d˙푛푉
]
(4.8)
where 푑˙⟨푘⟩ =
⎧⎨⎩ 0 푘 = 1푑⟨푘⟩−푑⟨푘−1⟩
푡⟨푘⟩−푡⟨푘−1⟩ 푘 > 1
(4.9)
D¨ =
[
t d¨1 . . . d¨푛푉
]
(4.10)
where 푑¨⟨푘⟩ =
⎧⎨⎩ 0 푘 = 1푑˙⟨푘⟩−푑˙⟨푘−1⟩
푡⟨푘⟩−푡⟨푘−1⟩ 푘 > 1
(4.11)
Function 1.1.3 - Partitioning
Page 77 of 189
The two data sets (value and diﬀerential) are now partitioned into the intervals best
suited for extracting episodes. The partitioning interval is the interval, in samples,
at which partition boundaries occur. It is written 퐼푝 and the corresponding number
of partitions in the waveform is 푛푝. The partitioning interval will be the same for
all variables to decrease computer expense. Since STME is partly deﬁned by the
timing of its dynamics in relation to the throw time, a suitable value of 퐼푝 for one
variable is likely to be suitable for other variables, because the time characteristics
of STME dynamics across all variables are very similar.
푛푝 =
⌊
퐿
퐼푝
⌋
(4.12)
There will be a few samples left over at the end of the waveform unless 퐿 − 1 is a
multiple of 퐼푝. In practice, this should only be a small proportion of the waveform
because 퐼푝 will be designed to be small compared to 퐿.
The waveform is partitioned by storing the start and end values of each partition
in new matrices. The end value of partition 푘 becomes the start value of partition
푘 + 1 and the same is true for time values. The following assignments are made for
values of 푘 from 1 to 푛푝 and values of 푙 from 1 to 푛푣:
푥⟨푘⟩ = 푑⟨(푘−1)퐼푝+1⟩ (4.13)
푦⟨푘⟩ = 푑⟨푘퐼푝⟩ (4.14)
푥˙⟨푘⟩ = 푑˙⟨(푘−1)퐼푝+1⟩ (4.15)
푦˙⟨푘⟩ = 푑˙⟨푘퐼푝⟩ (4.16)
푑¨ =
1
퐼푝
푘퐼푝∑
휅=(푘−1)퐼푝
푑¨⟨휅⟩ (4.17)
푡푥⟨푘⟩ = 푡⟨(푘−1)퐼푝+1⟩ (4.18)
푡푦⟨푘⟩ = 푡⟨푘퐼푝⟩ (4.19)
The value 푑¨ represents the average of the second diﬀerential over the partition. This
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gives a generalised view of the shape of this part of the waveform and is more useful
than the second diﬀerential value at a particular point.
Figure 4.13 shows graphically how values are chosen and stored in the partitioning
process.
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Figure 4.13: Assignment of values in the partitioning process
Function 1.1.4 - Qualitative classiﬁcation
The values of the ﬁrst and second diﬀerentials are used to classify the behaviour of
each partition as a certain qualitative state. The possible qualitative states have
distinct graphical shapes which are shown in ﬁgure 4.14. For each partition and
each variable, the qualitative state value for the partition, 푠, is determined based
on the qualitative state of the quantities 푥, 푥˙, 푦, 푦˙ and 푑¨. The qualitative state of
a variable is deﬁned here as the sign of the variable. A qualitative state is written
with square brackets around the original variable, e.g. [푥], and can take the values
+, - or 0. Table 4.1 shows the rules for determining the partition's qualitative state.
Each 푠 element takes a letter value between 풜 and ℐ.
The comparison of gradients is subject to a similarity threshold, to avoid rapid
changes of qualitative state between partitions with very slightly diﬀerent gradients
but which are parts of the same overall trend.
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Figure 4.14: List of deﬁned qualitative states
State [푦 − 푥] [푥˙] [푦˙]
[
푑¨
]
풜 any [0] [0] [0]
ℬ [+] [+] [+] [+]
풞 [+] [+] [+] [0]
풟 [+] [+] [+] [−]
ℰ [−] [−] [−] [+]
ℱ [−] [−] [−] [0]
풢 [−] [−] [−] [−]
ℋ All other conditions where [−]
ℐ All other conditions where [+]
Table 4.1: Table of criteria for deducing the qualitative state of a partition
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for each variable do
Establish episode 1 as the ﬁrst interval;
/* 푘푝 = 1, 푗 = 1, 푘푒 = 1 */
/* 휎⟨1,푙⟩ = 푠⟨1,푙⟩, 푥푒⟨1,푙⟩ = 푥⟨1,푙⟩, 푦푒⟨1,푙⟩ = 푦⟨1,푙⟩, 휏푥⟨1,푙⟩ = 푡푥⟨1,푙⟩,
휏푦⟨1,푙⟩ = 푡푦⟨1,푙⟩ */
while 푠⟨푘푝,푙⟩ = 푠⟨(푘푝+1),푙⟩ do
increment 푘푝;
end
/* The current interval is now the last interval of this
episode */
Replace ﬁnal values in this episode with the ﬁnal values of the current
interval;
/* 푦푒⟨1,푙⟩ = 푦⟨푘푝,푙⟩, 휏푦⟨1,푙⟩ = 푡푦⟨푘푝,푙⟩ */
Increment 푘푝 and 푘푒 once;
while 푘푝 < 푛푝 do
Establish the 푘푒th episode as containing all values from the 푘푝th
partition;
while 푠⟨푘푝,푙⟩ = 푠⟨(푘푝+1),푙⟩ do
increment 푘푝;
end
Replace ﬁnal values in this episode with the ﬁnal values of the current
interval;
/* 푦푒⟨푘푒,푙⟩ = 푦⟨푘푝,푙⟩, 휏푦⟨푘푒,푙⟩ = 푡푦⟨푘푝,푙⟩ */
Increment 푘푝 and 푘푒 once;
end
end
Algorithm 1: Concatenation of partitions to episodes
Functions 1.1.5 and 1.1.6 - Episode formation Let 푘푝 be the index of the
partition, 푙 the variable number, and 푘푒 the number of the episode formed. Algorithm
1 shows the algorithm for the concatenation of partitions into episodes.
For each variable, those partitions which have the same qualitative state can be
concatenated to form episodes. An episode's start value is the start value (푥) from
the ﬁrst partition in the episode, and the end value of the episode is the end value
(푦) of the last interval.
The episodes are stored in a diﬀerent manner to the partition data. The matrix of
episodes, known as the proﬁle, for each variable is labelled P푙 and has the following
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format:
P푙 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
휎⟨1,푙⟩ 휏푥⟨1,푙⟩ 휏푦⟨1,푙⟩ 푥푒⟨1,푙⟩ 푦푒⟨1,푙⟩
...
...
휎⟨푛푒,푙⟩ 휏푥⟨푛푒,푙⟩ 휏푦⟨푛푒,푙⟩ 푥푒⟨푛푒,푙⟩ 푦푒⟨푛푒,푙⟩
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (4.20)
Function 1.2 - Rule base generation
The output of function 1.1 is a set of episode strings of varying lengths and with
diﬀerent qualitative representations. Each episode has associated quantities, a serial
number (i.e. the 푘th episode in the proﬁle), a start time and an end time.
These properties can be used to create links between proﬁles generated from diﬀerent
fault conditions. It is fair to assume that even if the qualitative representations for
two faults, say 푓1 and 푓2, are quite diﬀerent, there will still be common episodes
which can be seen in both proﬁles, because fault simulations are to be carried out
such that the actuator is on the point of failure but that the throw still reaches
completion. This means that all stages of the actuator's throw will be present in
all fault proﬁles, but that the dynamics will probably be diﬀerent. The common
episodes will, however, have diverse associated quantities, and these can be used to
diagnose the fault condition.
Function 1.2.1 - Finding common episodes
Proﬁles cannot be compared directly together because it is not certain that all
episodes in the sequence will be the same, or that there will be a ﬁxed number of
episodes for all possible faults. Therefore, those episodes which are not common
to all fault conditions must ﬁrst be discarded. These unwanted episodes can be
unusual behaviours or they can be spurious small sequences induced by variations
in the variables. The spurious sequences are not generally repeatable within a
simulation and therefore must be discounted. An example of a spurious sequence is
shown in ﬁgure 4.15.
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Figure 4.15: Illustration of spurious episode sequences
An episode shall be deemed to be spurious and ignored if its length or height are less
than preset limits. This ensures that only episodes which represent major trends in
the waveform are actually considered for matching. The limits are set separately for
each possible episode value, each fault condition and each measured variable. This
allows adjustments to take account of varying dynamic performances for diﬀerent
conditions.
It should be noticed that this method will also label as spurious all the turning point
episodes (ℐ and 풥 ) in the proﬁles, because they are usually small in comparison to
the length threshold and therefore little variation can be seen in any of the values.
The P matrices will be shortened following this process, which will be carried out
for each variable, each fault condition and each repetition.
For each fault, each repetition's qualitative data should, in theory, look identical.
In practice, however, it is unavoidable that there will be some variations, especially
if a fault signiﬁcantly changes the qualitative performance of the actuator.
Algorithm 2 is used to isolate a set of matching episodes which can be found in all
waveforms for all fault conditions, yet still be used to determine which condition is
most likely. The scaling factor 푔 is used to normalise the scales of units of time and
the measured variable, for the magnitude calculation to be meaningful.
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Set global counters to ∞ for each qualitative state;
for each proﬁle do
Separate the episodes according to qualitative state;
for each possible qualitative state do
Order the episodes of this qualitative state according to their
magnitude, deﬁned as
√
푔2 (휏푦 − 휏푥)2 + (푦 − 푥)2;
Count the number of episodes of this qualitative state in this proﬁle;
if the count is less than the global counter for this qualitative state
then
Set the global counter to the value of the local count;
end
end
end
/* Minimum numbers of episodes for each qualitative state have
now been found */
for each proﬁle do
for each qualitative state do
if local count = minimum count then
Assume all episodes match directly as common episodes;
end
else if local count > minimum count then
Find matches using least-squares approximation;
end
/* The number of matches will be equal to the minimum
count for this QS */
end
end
Algorithm 2: Episode matching
Let the number of common episodes obtained be represented by 푛푐.
Resulting P matrices will have the form
P푙 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
휎⟨1,푙⟩ 휏푥⟨1,푙⟩ 휏푦⟨1,푙⟩ 푥푒⟨1,푙⟩ 푦푒⟨1,푙⟩
...
...
휎⟨푛푐,푙⟩ 휏푥⟨푛푐,푙⟩ 휏푦⟨푛푐,푙⟩ 푥푒⟨푛푐,푙⟩ 푦푒⟨푛푐,푙⟩
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (4.21)
Function 1.2.2 - Relative quantity calculation
In order to make the rules fully transferable from one actuator to another (assuming
that the changes in behaviour are proportional from one actuator to another), the
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episode values are expressed in terms of the diﬀerence between the current measured
value and the average value for fault-free behaviour. Thus, for each episode, each
repetition (with 푅 repetitions for each fault) and each fault condition, the following
calculations are made:
For 푘 = 1 to 푛푐, 푙 = 1 to 푛푣
x푓0⟨푘,푙⟩ =
1
푅
푅∑
푗=1
x푓0⟨푗,푘,푙⟩ (4.22)
y
푓0⟨푘,푙⟩ =
1
푅
푅∑
푗=1
y
푓0⟨푗,푘,푙⟩ (4.23)
휏푥 푓0⟨푘,푙⟩ =
1
푅
푅∑
푗=1
휏푥 푓0⟨푗,푘,푙⟩ (4.24)
휏 푦 푓0⟨푘,푙⟩ =
1
푅
푅∑
푗=1
휏 푦 푓0⟨푗,푘,푙⟩ (4.25)
For 푖 = 2 to 푛퐹 − 1, 푗 = 1 to 푅, 푘 = 1 to 푛퐶 , 푙 = 1 to 푛푉
x푟푒푙 (푓푖) = x푓푖 − x푓0⟨푘,푙⟩ (4.26)
y
푟푒푙 (푓푖)
= y
푓푖
− y
푓0⟨푘,푙⟩ (4.27)
휏푥 푟푒푙 (푓푖) = 휏푥 푓푖 − 휏푥 푓0⟨푘,푙⟩ (4.28)
휏 푦 푟푒푙 (푓푖) = 휏 푦 푓푖 − 휏 푦 푓0⟨푘,푙⟩ (4.29)
Each common relative episode value is given a usage ﬂag which is initially set to 1,
which indicates that it shall be used to form rules.
Functions 1.2.3 and 1.2.4 - Optimisation
The two optimisation functions allow the system to avoid making ineﬃcient rules
by checking common episode values against criteria and clearing the usage ﬂag if
the value fails the test. Function 1.2.3 uses algorithm 3, which eliminates episode
values which do not noticeably deviate from the fault-free case.
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for each common episode value do
Compare the magnitude of the relative value with the deviation threshold;
if relative value does not exceed the threshold then
clear the usage ﬂag;
end
end
Algorithm 3: Exclusion of values which do not vary appreciably from the
fault-free case
for each common episode value with usage ﬂag set do
for each fault condition 푓푖 do
for each fault condition 푓푖2 except 푓푖 do
Find 푣푓푖 − 푣푓푖2 where 푣 is the current episode value;
If it is less than the fault distinction threshold then clear the usage
ﬂag;
end
end
end
Algorithm 4: Exclusion of values which are too similar to those from other
fault conditions
Function 1.2.4 uses algorithm 4. This function eliminates the values which are too
close to those of other faults, thereby increasing the eﬃciency of the rules which are
left to be formed. The threshold is deﬁned separately for each variable and each
value type.
Function 1.2.5 - Membership functions
The peak of a fault's membership function should be set to occur where the diﬀerence
value corresponds to the measurements made at maximum fault severity. Once a P
matrix of the form in equation 4.21 has been obtained for each measured variable
and each fault, the rules can be generated. The rules are expressed as parameters
for fuzzy membership functions.
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Variation away from normal behaviour will result in a rapid decrease in membership
of the fault free set. Variation between normal and the fault will result in a gradual
change in membership. All faults will be simulated up to the the very point of failure.
Therefore, variation of any one variable beyond that measured during simulation of
fault 푓1(100) is unlikely to be a result of 푓1, because the actuator would have failed.
It is possible that another fault 푓2 could cause a further increase in a certain value,
beyond that seen when the actuator is failing with fault 푓1. Figure 4.16 illustrates
this concept, showing how membership functions for diﬀerent faults can overlap for
diﬀerent sizes of variation.
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Figure 4.16: Membership functions as rules on one variable in an episode
푓 (푥;ℎ1, 푐1, ℎ2, 푐2) = 푒
−(푥−푐1)2
2ℎ21 − 푒
−(푥−푐2)2
2ℎ22 (4.30)
Gaussian membership functions, as expressed in equation 4.30, were chosen for rule
formation because of their smooth transitions and their logical set of parameters
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which map well to the variable space. The parameters ℎ1 and ℎ2 govern the gradient
of the left- and right-hand transitions respectively. Smaller values of ℎ result in
quicker transitions. The 푐1 and 푐2 parameters govern the left- and right-hand points,
respectively, at which the function is at its maximum value. Setting 푐1 > 푐2 results
in the maximum value of the membership function being less than 1. Conversely,
setting 푐1 < 푐2 results in an interval in the variable, of size 푐2 − 푐1, over which the
membership is continuously 1. The system is programmed to set 푐1 = 푐2, so that
the membership is only ever brieﬂy 1 before it begins the decay transition. This
is important because it recognises the possibility that an increase or decrease in a
measured value may be a result of more than one possible condition.
The rising transition from the fault free point to the faulty diﬀerence is referred to
as the attack transition; the falling transition which occurs if the diﬀerence moves
further in the same direction is referred to as the decay transition. A standard value
of ℎ was chosen by experimentation for the decay transitions. The attack transitions'
ℎ values were set proportional to the diﬀerence, so that gradual change between
fault free and faulty results in a transition from 0 to 1. The proportional constant
was chosen by experimentation. Figure 4.17 illustrates some typical membership
functions.
The system is designed to deal correctly with all possible fault diﬀerence values,
positive and negative. It must therefore assign the values of ℎ1, ℎ2, 푐1 and 푐2
diﬀerently, depending on the sign of the diﬀerence.
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Figure 4.17: Establishing membership functions for faults
4.2.3 Function 2 - Finding base quantities for fault free opera-
tion
Function 2.1 - Representation of measured data
The same process is carried out on measured data during the running in period as
was carried out on the simulated fault data in function 1. The running in data should
be completely free of faults. Proﬁles are generated for each running-in operation.
The common episodes are found using the process in function 1.2 and the values
associated with them are stored for use in calculating percentage changes from
normal behaviour.
The STME on which the system is to be installed will be checked to ensure no faults
are present, and then 푅 throws shall be carried out in each direction, to measure
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fault free data. For each repetition, a proﬁle P is obtained in exactly the same way
as in function 1.1.
The P matrix is then processed so that it only contains the common episodes,
resulting in a matrix of the form in equation 4.21.
The means of episode values in each P matrix are collected as a single set of values
P:
P푙 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
휎⟨1,푙⟩
∑푅
푗=1 휏푥⟨1,푙⟩
푅
∑푅
푗=1 휏푦⟨1,푙⟩
푅
∑푅
푗=1 푥푒⟨1,푙⟩
푅
∑푅
푗=1 푦푒⟨1,푙⟩
푅
...
...
휎⟨푛푐,푙⟩
∑푅
푗=1 휏푥⟨푛푐,푙⟩
푅
∑푅
푗=1 휏푦⟨푛푐,푙⟩
푅
∑푅
푗=1 푥푒⟨푛푐,푙⟩
푅
∑푅
푗=1 푦푒⟨푛푐,푙⟩
푅
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (4.31)
A matrix such as this shall be generated for each variable measured. These matrices
are then the benchmark against which operationally measured values will be compared.
4.2.4 Function 3 - On-line diagnosis of faults
Function 3.1 - Proﬁle representation
The process for representing operationally measured waveforms is almost identical
to that in function 1.1, except that the quantities are expressed as the diﬀerence
between the absolute, measured value and the fault free values obtained in function
2.2.
The input for each operation is a single matrix of measured values M which is
represented, as with previous functions, as a set of proﬁles P푙, one for each variable
measured.
The proﬁles are then processed, using the common episode locations from function
1.2 to leave an edited matrix containing only the common episodes, as seen in
equation 4.21. The episode values in P are converted to diﬀerences by subtracting
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the average fault free quantities, just as in function 1.2.2.
Function 3.2 - Calculation of fault scores for the current operation
The next step is to calculate fault memberships for each possible fault, according to
algorithm 5.
for each possible fault do
for each variable do
for each common episode value do
if usage ﬂag is set then
Evaluate the membership function and add to the total for this
fault;
Increment the number of rules evaluated for this fault;
end
end
Divide total of memberships by number of rules evaluated;
end
end
Algorithm 5: Diagnosis of faults through rule evaluation
This routine occurs every time the actuator operates. Over time, the average
membership for a fault will increase, if that fault is gradually becoming more severe.
4.2.5 Function 4 - Trend analysis and alarms
The objective of the system is to attract attention to the detected development
of fault conditions. The system represents this development as an increase in the
strength of the fault from operation to operation.
Previous fault diagnosis systems have suﬀered from poor reliability because the
alarm levels have been set arbitrarily. It is more appropriate to set these levels based
on experience from trial installations. Therefore function 4 focuses on detecting
positive trends in the fault strengths and presenting them for human examination.
For each fault simulated in a case study, a row of graphs is produced, showing the
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fault score against the severity of the fault (each data point being a single throw
where the fault is incrementally increased).
A linear trend is imposed on the graph. This trend is calculated using a least-squares
method. The gradient of this trend gives an indication of how fast or strongly the
fault is developing. Therefore, the fault with the highest trend gradient is the one
whose eﬀects are appearing most strongly in the measured data.
The fault strength is the total of the membership functions for each variable and
each episode in a proﬁle constructed from the measurements of one operation.
Figure 4.18 shows a sample of ideal output from function 4. The rows represent the
diﬀerent conditions imposed on the actuator, and the columns represent the fault
score for each possible fault. When the actuator is fault-free, the fault score is high
for the fault-free condition and low for all the other possible faults, and none of
the scores changes appreciably. The 푥-axis for this condition represents the number
of operations in the fault-free data set. For the imposed faults, it represents the
incremental adjustments which simulate the introduction of a fault. Here, a gradual
increase can be seen in the score corresponding to the simulated fault, a decrease in
the fault-free score (showing that the actuator's condition is moving outside normal
boundaries), and no change in the score for other possible faults.
This ideal situation is not expected to be seen in the testing phase, because the
rule base is not optimised in this system. Optimisation of the rule base means
deleting some rules, but this has not been included as part of the system because
it was considered more important for the rules to consider all available parts of the
waveform at all times. Therefore, it is likely that if two faults exhibit some similar
characteristics, their scores may both increase when one of the faults is gradually
introduced. However, the score for the fault being simulated should have the highest
gradient on the graph.
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Figure 4.18: Ideal sample output of function 4
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Chapter 5
Case study I: External doors on class
158 DMU
5.1 Background
Classes 158 and 159 are inter-regional/inter-city DMUs with a single saloon and
vestibules at the ends of each vehicle. The external doors are double-leaf swing-plug
doors driven by a single Tebel Pneumatik air actuator and a mechanical linkage
with over-centre locking bars for each leaf. Figure 5.1 shows a plan view of the door
mechanism when locked, unlocked but still closed, and open. The actuator (1, the
dashed area) opens and closes the door using a rotary action about the pivot (2).
This moves the locking rods (4), which are attached to pillars (6) that then rotate.
Drive arms link the pillars to the door leaves; thus when the pillar rotates, the door
leaves swing outwards.
The principle of the locking mechanism is that by driving the mechanism a few
degrees past the point where the doors are shut, it becomes impossible for the door
to be opened by force against the leaves (since pushing outwards on the door leaves
now just increases the strength of the lock). The lengths of the over-centre locking
Page 94 of 189
LOCKED
UNLOCKED
OPEN
1
2
3
5
4
66
1
2
3
5
4
6
ACTUATOR
ACTUATOR PIVOT
LOCKING NUTS
OVER-CENTRE LOCKING BARS
DOOR LEAVES
DRIVE PILLARS
NOT TO SCALE
Figure 5.1: Class 158/159 door mechanism, plan view, not all parts shown
bars are adjustable by maintainers, to account for the variations between each door's
performance. Lengthening the bars increases the force required to lock the door;
shortening them decreases the force required. In either case, if the bar length is
outside acceptable boundaries, the door may fail to lock. The length of the bar is
set according to the air pressure in the actuator at the instant of locking. This is
measured using a dial gauge during a closing throw where the air has been bled
from the actuator and then reapplied. The requirement is that the locking pressure
must be between 4.0 and 4.5 bar. In practice, the doors are set towards the high
end of this range, since the pressure tends to drop over time.
Two failure modes were simulated by adjusting the locking bar to be either too long
or too short. By starting from a point where the doors are correctly adjusted, the
progression of an incipient fault can be simulated.
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Detailed failure mode listings were not available for this door, but an informal
discussion with the specialist engineer who facilitated the data collection revealed
that the over-centre locking bars shorten naturally during operation, eventually
bringing the locking pressure below the threshold. This failure mode therefore
reﬂects directly in the simulation where the bar was shortened; conversely, the bar
lengthening was not considered to be a natural failure mode but rather a fault which
would cause eﬀects that the diagnosis system should be able to spot.
5.1.1 Setup of experiments and controls
The experiments were carried out on vehicle 52744, in unit 158883, stabled on
an outdoor road at Salisbury DMUD1. The engine was running so that the on-
board air supply could be used. It should be noted that the main reservoir air
pressure ﬂuctuated slightly throughout testing because of the way the air compressor
is designed to switch in and out, so the starting values for the pressure waveforms are
of limited signiﬁcance: the actuator operates satisfactorily for all values of incoming
air pressure experienced during this data collection session.
The general layout of the experiment is shown in ﬁgure 5.2. A PC and data
acquisition unit were used to record the data. An air pressure transducer was
installed on each side of the actuator, and a displacement transducer was added to
measure the rotational displacement of one drive pillar.
Triggering measurement using the control buttons
Using opto-isolators, the push buttons which control the door were interfaced to the
data acquisition system, allowing measurement to be triggered when the buttons
were pressed. This meant that all data ﬁles were synchronised to the start of the
door operation, allowing for better comparison between captured ﬁles.
1Diesel Multiple Unit Depot
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Figure 5.2: Setup of data measurement equipment on the door unit
The open and close push buttons are both normally-open and provide a pulse of
+24 V when pressed. The measurement system was conﬁgured to wait for a high
pulse on the digital output of the opto-isolator before starting measurement.
Displacement transducer
A drawstring displacement transducer was used to measure the door's displacement
between the two stable positions. This sensor has a maximum drawstring length of
25 cm and therefore could not be attached to any part of the door leaf, because it
moves through a greater distance than 25 cm. The transducer was positioned so that
some of the string could be wrapped around one of the vertical drive pillars. This
measured the rotational displacement of the drive system, which can be expressed
as a percentage of the total measurable displacement.
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Air pressure transducers
An air pressure transducer was ﬁtted in line with the incoming air pipes on either
side of the actuator using brass pipe ﬁttings and spare hose. The hoses were kept
as short as possible to minimise the trapped air in the system, as this would aﬀect
the accuracy of the measurements.
5.1.2 General format of experiments
Each door was ﬁrst adjusted so that the over-centre locking pressure was around 4.5
bar. Control measurements were then taken. Each door was operated ten times in
each direction.
5.1.3 Lengthening of the over-centre locking rod
Starting from settings which gave an over-centre locking pressure of around 4.5 bar,
each door was gradually adjusted to make the over-centre locking rod longer. The
severity of the fault was measured by taking the over-centre locking pressure after
each adjustment. Pressures of up to 7.5 bar (the full pressure of the incoming air
supply) were measured at this point.
The eﬀect of this fault is to increase the force required to lock the door. The graphs
in ﬁgure 5.3 show the results of the experiment on one of the doors. The top row
shows graphs of the three variables during opening, and the bottom row shows them
during closing. The green waveforms are from the starting condition, becoming more
red as the length of the bar was increased.
In the opening waveforms, the instant of unlocking becomes later as the length of the
bar is increased. This can be seen around point 1, as the unlocking characteristics
occur later in each successive waveform. Note that the incoming air pressure
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varies over a small range; this is not related to the fault simulations but rather
a characteristic of the air system.
The symptoms of this fault are much less visible in the closing graphs, because
the locking dynamics are smaller in the variables measured. Point 2 on the closing
graphs is where the lock engages. The dynamics of locking become later as the
length of the bar is increased, just as with opening.
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Figure 5.3: Lengthening the over-centre locking rod on `A' door
5.1.4 Shortening of the over-centre locking rod
Starting from settings which gave an over-centre locking pressure of around 4.5 bar,
each door was gradually adjusted to make the over-centre locking rod shorter. The
severity of the fault was measured by taking the over-centre locking pressure after
each adjustment. Pressures of as low as 1.6 bar were recorded.
Figure 5.4 shows the graphs for this experiment, again with the opening graphs
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on the top row and the closing graphs on the bottom. As the bar is progressively
shortened, the instant of unlocking becomes earlier, as can be seen at point 1 in
the opening graphs. The dynamics of unlocking occur earlier and become less
pronounced as the bar is shortened, which is expected given the way the door
operates. Because of the earlier unlocking, there is a general trend of earlier
movement throughout the opening operation: the door reaches its open position
earlier, as can be seen in all three measurements, but most pointedly on the displace-
ment waveform at point 2.
The locking dynamics during closing are again quite small, but there is still a general
trend at point 3, for the locking to occur earlier and with less pronounced dynamics
as the bar is shortened. Note also from the displacement proﬁle that the doors seem
to settle in a slightly less closed position when the bar is shortened - presumably
because the lock is looser.
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Figure 5.4: Shortening the over-centre locking rod on `A' door
Each of the four doors underwent the same experiments, and, qualitatively speaking,
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the eﬀects of the faults were the same in each case. This means that the data
collected are the right kind to test the system developed in this thesis.
5.1.5 Variations in performance
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Figure 5.5: Comparison of fault-free operation for the four actuators under test
Figure 5.5 shows graphs of the pressure on the opening side of the actuator, during
opening operations, from each of the four doors tested. The ﬁgures show that,
broadly speaking, the performance was qualitatively the same in each case, although
B door showed a slightly diﬀerent shape around the 3-4 second area from the
others. The variations in peak air pressure are due to the natural range of pressures
available from the air supply on board the train; the air compressor did not operate
continuously, but rather when pressure reached a lower limit.
Quantitatively, there was little variation between the four doors; perhaps most
signiﬁcant was the dip around the 1.8-2 second mark, which corresponds to the
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unlocking point: the time at which this occurred seemed to vary from door to door.
It was to be expected that there would be few quantitative diﬀerences, since the
actuator was moving more or less the same load in each case; the only diﬀerences
would have been in the adjustable parts of the mechanism - some of which were not
altered during the course of testing, such as the door height relative to the vehicle
body.
5.2 Test results
The data set from case study I comprises complete fault simulations for four doors.
There are 16 possible combinations of Test Actuator and Monitored Actuator. Using
the MATLAB implementation of the fault diagnosis system, testing was carried out
on all 16 possible actuator combinations. Disregarding those combinations where
the TA and MA are the same, there are 12 combinations which test whether the
rules can be transferred from one actuator to another.
5.2.1 Diagnosis system in action
Figure 5.6 shows waveforms from the fault free condition and the shortened over-
centre locking rod simulation, before and after ﬁltering and the identiﬁcation of the
proﬁle. The stem plots on the ﬁltered waveforms show start (circular markers) and
end (diamond markers) values associated with the episodes in the proﬁle. Episodes
which were shorter than the minimum length threshold were rejected, which is why
the whole of each waveform is not covered by an episode.
Comparing the episodes identiﬁed for the two waveforms, we can see that, in this
case, there is poor matching between the two proﬁles. The faulty proﬁle has only
ﬁve episodes, yet the fault-free one has seven. Of these, only three can be said to
be reasonably comparable: the ℬ and 풟 episodes at the start of the waveform, and
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Figure 5.6: Episode identiﬁcation in open pressure waveforms from closing
operations, C door, with fault-free and OC long conditions
the 풢 episode at the end.
This graphic demonstrates that there can be diﬃculties in identifying common
episodes for every waveform, but there is usually a core of qualitative information
which stays the same and can be used for rule formation. However, in this fault
condition, the only signiﬁcant change to the waveform occurs in an area where the
system is not consistent in classifying episodes, making it diﬃcult for the system to
diagnose the fault from this data. These waveforms were from a closing operation;
those from the opening operation show much more pronounced eﬀects which were
easier for the system to spot, so the fault was detected in the opening data.
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5.2.2 System outputs
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the number of combinations which fulﬁlled each test speciﬁ-
cation, for each condition simulated. Since the fault free condition was not changing
under adjustment, gradients of membership trends were irrelevant, so instead the
average membership values were compared in the same way.
Spec Condition OK combinations % eﬀectiveness
1
Fault free 12 100
OC Long 12 100
OC Short 12 100
2
Fault free 12 100
OC Long 11 91.7
OC Short 11 91.7
Table 5.1: Test results for opening movements on the pneumatic door
Spec Condition OK combinations % eﬀectiveness
1
Fault free 12 100
OC Long 9 75.0
OC Short 8 66.7
2
Fault free 12 100
OC Long 6 50.0
OC Short 9 75.0
Table 5.2: Test results for closing movements on the pneumatic door
The performance of the system clearly shows that, in the majority of cases, it is
capable of detecting the introduction of a fault, and of determining which fault is
present. The performance of the system is markedly worse when working on data
from closing movements. This can be explained by the relative magnitude of the
fault eﬀects. In ﬁgures 5.3 and 5.4, it can clearly be seen that the introduction of the
faults causes much larger variations in the opening waveforms than in the closing
waveforms. This means that the system has useful information to make rules with,
especially when the eﬀects of heavy ﬁltering of the waveforms may be to eliminate
evidence of the one small kink in the pressure waveforms whose movement betrays
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the presence of faults.
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Figure 5.7: Results graphs for opening operations, A door as test actuator and C
as monitored actuator
Figure 5.7 shows the results of running the system for a single actuator combination.
The blue line is the fault strength at each point simulated; the red line is a ﬁrst-order
linear trend for the fault strength, calculated using the standard MATLAB polyfit
function, which uses least-squares approximation. The rules were established using
the test dataset from actuator A, and the monitoring dataset from actuator C. For
the fault-free simulation, it can clearly be seen that the diagnosis of the fault free
condition is high for each of the ten operations in the dataset.
When faults 1 and 2 are simulated, the diagnosis for the fault free condition gradually
reduces in strength, showing that the actuator is drifting away from a healthy
position. The diagnosis for the corresponding fault also increases, with a ﬁrm
positive trend as indicated by the red line. The diagnosis for the fault which is
not being simulated can be seen to stay quite low; even though it rises, it does not
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Figure 5.8: Results graphs for closing operations, A door as test actuator and C as
monitored actuator
rise as much as the simulated fault, so it diagnoses the fault correctly.
Comparing this with the results from closing operations (seen in ﬁgure 5.8) for the
same actuator combination, we see again the disparity between opening and closing
operations. The system is much weaker, with weaker positive or negative trends for
the fault strengths of the simulated fault. This is because the system was unable
to construct a strong rule set for the faults, which is understandable, given that
the variation in performance under faulty conditions is barely distinct for closing
operations.
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5.3 Conclusions
In this case study, two distinct and opposite faults were simulated on the door
actuators of a rail vehicle. The fault diagnosis system was then run on the data
and proved to be 100 % successful in detecting and 91.7 % successful in diagnosing
incipient faults from opening operation measurements. Despite the symptoms of the
faults being very small in the closing operations, the system was still able to detect
the onset of faults in some cases. These successful results show that the concept of
this diagnosis system is a valid one.
The diﬀerence in success rates between diagnoses from opening and closing operations
suggests that the eﬀects of a fault need to be quite noticeable in order for the system
to be able to spot them after ﬁltering. One area for future work might be to improve
the algorithm for the classiﬁcation of qualitative states, perhaps to the point where
ﬁltering is no longer required.
In particular cases where the system was not eﬀective, there were both false alarms
(signiﬁcant fault trends under fault free conditions) and misdiagnoses. It seems
that, under both fault simulations, there was an upward trend for both diagnoses,
despite the fact that the faults have diametrically opposite eﬀects on the measured
variables (it would therefore be expected that when fault 1 is simulated, fault 2
shows no increase in strength at all).
Overall, this case study is pleasing because the system worked correctly for all
combinations of test and monitored actuators. Despite the disappointing closing
results, the system would have detected the faults from the opening data, which
means that in practice, the fault would have been detected and diagnosed correctly.
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Chapter 6
Case study II: HW Switch Actuator
6.1 Background
The HW switch actuator is widely used on railway junctions throughout the UK. It
is driven by a 110 V DC permanent magnet motor connected through a reduction
gearbox to the drive of the switch. A clutch (which can be either magnetic or
mechanical, depending on the age of the machine) is used to disconnect the motor,
should the force in the drive exceed a certain tolerance. A sketch of the HW actuator
is shown in ﬁgure 6.1.
DETECTIO N 
CO NTACTS AND LO CKING  
M ECHANISM
DC M O TO R
REDUCTIO N 
G EARS
DRIVE LINK
Figure 6.1: Sketch of a HW switch actuator showing main components
A mechanical locking mechanism is situated at the end of the machine, locking
the points in place and making electrical contacts for detection. A backdrive is
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sometimes installed on long switches in order to spread the throw force further up
the switch. A diagram of the transmission of forces in a backdrive is shown in ﬁgure
6.2.
ACTUATOR
STRETCHER
 BAR
CHANNEL ROD
PIVOT
SWITCH
RAILS
Figure 6.2: Transmission of forces in a backdrive
Although the motors in these machines are rated to 110 V DC, it is common to drive
them at a higher voltage. Lineside DC voltages are typically around 120 V DC. This
is produced by rectiﬁcation from AC with smoothing by batteries. However, one
installation, which forms part of the test group for this case study, was found to
be driven from full-wave rectiﬁed mains power with no smoothing. If this mains
voltage was not stepped down by a transformer then the rectiﬁed average voltage is
153 V DC, which means that the DC motor is being operated approximately 40%
out of tolerance.
Despite this, motor faults are relatively uncommon in electric switch actuators.
The most common cause of failure is incorrect adjustment of the many adjustable
mechanical parts around a switch. If any one of these is misaligned, the forces
required to throw the points increase markedly, until they overcome the clutch in
the actuator, resulting in a failed throw.
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6.2 Experimental setup
An automatic test drive unit was built to automatically operate the actuator and
measure data using a data acquisition unit. The force in the drive was measured
using a purpose-built load pin which replaced a standard bolt in the drive link. The
displacement of the switch was measured using a drawstring sensor and the motor
current was measured using a current clamp on the drive wire to the motor. A
diagram of the experimental setup components is shown in ﬁgure 6.3.
LOAD PIN & DISPLACEMENT 
TRANSDUCER
CURRENT TRANSDUCER
CROCODILE CLIPS
LOCKING AND DETECTION 
MODULE
DATA ACQUISITION DEVICE
SENSOR POWER SUPPLY
GEARS
SWITCH 
RAILS
STOCK 
RAILS
HW SWITCH 
ACTUATOR
MOTOR
DRIVE 
MECHANISM
STRETCHER BAR
DETECTION RODS
A
B
C
D
E
F
SWITCHING AND 
DETECTION 
INTERFACE UNIT
DRIVE CABLE
DETECTION
CABLES
PORTABLE 
CONTROL AND 
MEASUREMENT 
UNIT
SERIAL LINK
USB
A
B
C
D
E
F
SINGLE PHASE 240 V AC 
4x 13 A
Figure 6.3: Experimental setup for data collection from the HW switch actuator
6.3 Faults simulated
A variety of faults was simulated on several instances of the HW actuator. The focus
was on incipient faults, since abrupt faults can usually be detected using current
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methods. The following subsections describe each fault in detail, along with its
simulation.
6.3.1 Misadjustment of the backdrive
The fulcrum points of the backdrive can be adjusted in order to transmit more
or less force to the heel of the switch. By adjusting the mechanism, as shown in
ﬁgure 6.4, it was possible to simulate the backdrive falling out of adjustment in both
directions (i.e. overdriving and underdriving).
ADJUSTMENTS 
FOR OVERDRIVING
ADJUSTMENTS FOR 
UNDERDRIVING
CHANNEL ROD
BACKDRIVE PIVOT 
MOUNTING PLATE
DRIVE ROD
BACKDRIVE PIVOT 
MOUNTING PLATE
RUNNING RAIL
SLEEPER
Figure 6.4: Adjustment of force in backdrive
The eﬀects of this fault were quite subtle, but nonetheless visible in some of the
output waveforms. Figure 6.5 shows the eﬀects when the backdrive is underdriven:
the forces decrease in the drive and therefore less force is required to throw the
switch over, resulting in lower end forces for locking. Point 1 shows the decrease in
forces for the normal to reverse movement, and point 2 shows the same decrease in
the opposite throw direction.
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Figure 6.5: Underdriving the backdrive on the switch at Escrick
6.3.2 Overdriving to one side
Misadjustment of the drive link can cause the switch to push too hard to one side
before locking takes place. On the HW drive link a pair of nuts can be adjusted so
that the actuator pushes further to one side before engaging the lock. This is shown
in ﬁgure 6.6.
Even small adjustments have a large eﬀect on the forces, so adjustments of the nuts
were made in increments of 1
6
turn. Eventually, at a certain level of adjustment,
the force becomes high enough to stall the actuator before locking takes place. This
fault was simulated in both directions. Figure 6.7 shows the eﬀects when the switch
was overdriven towards reverse. At point 1, we can see evidence in both the force
and current waveforms that the actuator is working harder to push the switch over;
likewise, at point 2, we see that the force in the switch is higher before unlocking
from the reverse position, as the fault worsens.
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ADJUSTMENTS 
FOR OVERDRIVING 
REVERSE
ADJUSTMENTS FOR 
OVERDRIVING 
NORMAL
DRIVE ROD
DRIVE LINK
STOCK RAIL
STRETCHER BAR
POINT MACHINE
SWITCH RAIL
Figure 6.6: Adjustment of the HW drive link to overdrive the switch to one side
6.3.3 Relevance of fault simulations to real failure modes
Over a ﬁve-year period on the Southern Zone of the UK railway network, the
following ﬁve faults were the most common recorded causes of failure on HW switch
actuators [65]:
∙ No fault found on examination (17 %)
∙ Detector rod out of adjustment (9 %)
∙ Drive rod out of adjustment (9 %)
∙ Facing point lock out of adjustment (6 %)
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Figure 6.7: Eﬀects of overdriving the switch to reverse, from switch A at Bristol
∙ Drive rod out of adjustment/gauge (5 %)
The high proportion of failures where diagnosis was not possible indicates that the
actuator was suﬀering intermittent faults which did not present when the maintenance
staﬀ attended the actuator. However, of the remaining faults, the two which concern
the drive rod adjustment are directly related to the simulations of overdriving
towards one side or the other. Given that there was a high number of adjustment
faults throughout the top 25 failure modes, it was considered to be useful to simulate
poor adjustment of the backdrive, since it is a plausible failure mode and causes
eﬀects which are smaller than straight overdriving, adding a further diagnosis challenge
for the purposes of testing the system.
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Figure 6.8: Comparison of fault-free normal to reverse operations for each actuator
6.3.4 Variations between actuators
Figure 6.8 shows force waveforms under the same conditions for normal to reverse
operation, for each of the three actuators. It is clear that there were signiﬁcant
quantitative diﬀerences between the actuators, because each is throwing a diﬀerent
length of rail. The friction characteristics and initial states of the actuators are
also likely to have been quite variable, since the actuators were not new. The
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locking forces were smaller for 1 and 2 than for 3. However, the general shape of
the waveforms, and the rough locations of step changes, were similar in each case,
allowing qualitative comparison to be performed by the diagnosis system.
6.4 Test results
The data set from case study II comprises simulations of two faults (overdriving
towards normal and reverse) on three HW switch actuators.
Two of the three actuators have backdrives, and on these actuators, two additional
faults were simulated (overdriving and underdriving of the backdrive). There are
9 possible combinations of Test Actuator and Monitored Actuator. Using the
MATLAB implementation of the fault diagnosis system, testing was carried out
on all 9 possible actuator combinations. Disregarding those combinations where the
TA and MA are the same, there are 6 combinations which test whether the rules
can be transferred from one actuator to another, for the overdrive faults, and two
combinations which test the same for the backdrive faults.
6.4.1 Diagnosis system in action
Episode identiﬁcation and matching
Figure 6.9 shows waveforms from the fault free condition and the overdriving towards
reverse fault simulation, before and after ﬁltering and the identiﬁcation of the proﬁle.
The stem plots on the ﬁltered waveforms show start (circular markers) and end
(diamond markers) values associated with episodes in the proﬁle. Episodes which
were shorter than the minimum length were rejected, which explains why there is
not complete coverage of the waveform. There is generally good agreement between
the two proﬁles, with most of the episodes common to both.
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Figure 6.9: Identiﬁcation of non-trivial episodes in HW current waveforms
휎
Fault free OD Reverse
휏푥 휏푦 푥 푦 휏푥 휏푦 푥 푦
ℬ 0.290 0.579 -0.039 1.357 0.290 0.579 -0.039 1.334
풟 0.580 0.789 1.367 2.701 0.580 0.789 1.344 2.632
ℰ 0.950 1.399 2.022 0.818 0.940 1.349 2.001 0.817
ℬ 1.670 2.039 0.905 1.212 1.360 1.969 0.817 1.288
풢 2.710 3.319 1.773 0.597 3.080 3.380 2.412 1.177
ℰ 3.320 3.790 0.593 -0.341 3.390 3.889 1.171 -0.343
Table 6.1: Proﬁles for HW current under fault free and OD reverse conditions,
common episodes only
The two ℬ episodes in the middle of the faulty waveform compete for the match
with the single episode in the fault-free waveform. The ﬁrst of the two wins because
its magnitude is greater than the second, and therefore is considered to match the
magnitude of the second episode in the fault-free waveform.
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Figure 6.10: Fault free (green) and OD reverse (red) ﬁltered waveforms, overlaid
with episode values where rules were evaluated
Figure 6.10 shows force waveforms from the overdriving reverse fault simulation -
the green plot is at the start of the simulation, i.e. fault free, and the red is at the
end, i.e. maximum severity. The shaded markers overlaid on the plots show episode
values (circles for start values, diamonds for end values) where these were used
in the diagnosis evaluation. The system is, in this case, strong at identifying the
right episode values to use for diagnosis: the ones where the fault causes the largest
eﬀects. Two episode mismatches can be seen in the normal to reverse waveform:
the two isolated diamonds in the middle of the plot. This is where an episode
has been recorded and matched to the one later in the waveform where the actual
changes have taken place. The correct match for these values would be at the end of
the waveform, where a column of diamonds descends towards the end of the faulty
waveform.
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6.4.2 System outputs
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 show the number of combinations which fulﬁlled each test speciﬁ-
cation, for each condition simulated. Since the fault free condition was not changing
under adjustment, gradients of membership trends were irrelevant, so instead the
average membership values were compared in the same way.
Spec Condition OK combinations % eﬀectiveness
1
Fault free 6/6 100
OD Normal 6/6 100
OD Reverse 6/6 100
Backdrive OD 1/2 50
Backdrive UD 1/2 50
2
Fault free 6/6 100
OD Normal 6/6 100
OD Reverse 5/6 83
Backdrive OD 1/2 50
Backdrive UD 0/2 0
Table 6.2: Test results for normal to reverse movements on the HW actuator
Spec Condition OK combinations % eﬀectiveness
1
Fault free 6/6 100
OD Normal 6/6 100
OD Reverse 5/6 83
Backdrive OD 2/2 100
Backdrive UD 2/2 100
2
Fault free 6/6 100
OD Normal 6/6 100
OD Reverse 4/6 67
Backdrive OD 2/2 100
Backdrive UD 0/2 0
Table 6.3: Test results for reverse to normal movements on the HW actuator
These results show a clear distinction in success between the overdriving faults,
which were detected and diagnosed well, and the backdrive faults, which are not
detected with the same level of success. This is probably a combination of two
factors: one, that the magnitude of fault eﬀects for the backdrive faults is much
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smaller than that for the overdriving faults, and two, that the order in which the
faults are presented to the rule-establishing function (function 1) aﬀects the way
the rules are made, because the margins imposed between rule values are applied
sequentially.
Figures 6.11 and 6.12 show successful fault diagnoses from the combination of
actuators A and B, under the simulation of overdriving faults.
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Figure 6.11: Fault diagnoses for normal to reverse movements, test actuator A,
monitored actuator B
6.5 Conclusions
In this case study, several adjustment faults were induced on a set of three HW
switch actuators. The fault diagnosis system was then run on the dataset. The
results show that the system is weak at transferring rules between actuators which
have very large diﬀerences in parameters, but that it is still sometimes capable
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Figure 6.12: Fault diagnoses for reverse to normal movements, test actuator A,
monitored actuator B
of correctly diagnosing incipient faults. This weakness identiﬁes opportunities for
further improvements in the future.
However, it is pleasing to note a near-100% success rate for the detection and
diagnosis of faults in the main actuator drive. Faults of this nature have been known
to lead to accidents (such as the Potters Bar derailment) and so the detection of
this fault is particularly relevant to industry.
In this case study, there were no false alarms, but there were some misdiagnoses.
However, when the system worked well, the diagnosis for other faults tended to fall
as the simulated fault diagnosis rose. This showed that the rules had established
themselves well in these cases. The lack of false alarms is encouraging because it is
very important that technical staﬀ trust the system to only warn them when a fault
is really present.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
7.1 Summary
In this thesis, a practical design problem has been analysed, decomposed and solved
using a systems engineering approach to structure the traditional research activities.
Methods applied in diﬀerent industry sectors were researched and evaluated.
Qualitative trend analysis, a method previously employed in the diagnosis of chemical
plants, inspired the solution developed here. The system uses QTA to obtain
abstract qualitative and quantitative information from measured waveforms. The
information is used to form fuzzy rules which can be applied to all STME actuators
of a particular type, avoiding the need for lengthy training periods, which would be
impractical on the railways.
Two case studies, each a practical industrial application of the system, were carried
out with the generous cooperation of Network Rail and South West Trains. The
results show that the system is capable of fulﬁlling its requirements, but that there
are some weaknesses which need to be addressed.
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7.2 Limitations
The key limitation that the system presents is that the additive relativisation
method is not suﬃciently accurate or consistent to give reliable results under most
conditions. The approach is, however, much more detailed and sensitive than the
analysis currently implemented in the industry. The output of the system would
not be dependable in the context of a highly demanding infrastructure or vehicle
system, although the incidence of false alarms (i.e. fault indications during fault
free operation) was very low, and in fact in case study II, there were no false fault
indications when the actuator was fault free.
This is a problem because the application of a condition monitoring system on the
railways would be as an aid to condition-based maintenance of assets. Condition-
based maintenance eliminates costly and ineﬃcient periodic maintenance tasks,
instead directing tasks to be carried out as and when the condition monitoring
system deems it necessary. The monitoring system must therefore be very accurate
and reliable. False alarms damage the credibility of the system, making it less
eﬀective because maintenance staﬀ are wont to disregard its outputs if they have
experience of them being inaccurate.
The system still relies on the measurement of several dynamic values, which requires
monitoring and data acquisition equipment to be installed in situ on the actuator,
something which might incur signiﬁcant expense in retroﬁtting.
7.3 Proposals for future work
The system has demonstrated that the concept of using qualitative trend analysis
for fault diagnosis is valid, and that it has the potential to solve the problem of
diagnosing multiple, distributed assets without carrying out exhaustive testing on
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each instance.
To achieve a practical system, the weak points of the design must be addressed.
One of these, as already mentioned, is use of diﬀerences to express relative change
between faulty and fault-free performance. Whilst the QTA approach is eﬀective
and intuitive, it would be beneﬁcial to investigate the implementation of diﬀerent
ways of expessing the relative changes.
Another weak point is the determination of the qualitative trends from measured
data. The system as presented in this thesis made heavy use of low-pass ﬁltering
in order to be able to recognise shapes and trends on a scale which allowed easy
comparisons between waveforms from diﬀerent actuators or diﬀerent conditions. The
performance of the system might be improved if trends on the correct scale could be
identiﬁed from unﬁltered data. This was particularly evident in the data from the
closing doors in case study I - there were clear fault eﬀects in the unﬁltered data,
but these were diﬃcult to retain in the ﬁltered data, making the system perform
quite badly on all the closing data. The authors of the papers [47, 48, 49, 50] which
inspired the QTA approach for this problem suggested the use of neural networks or
other AI approaches to determine accurately the shape of trends in the data. This is
one possibility which was not explored in this thesis, because it seemed to be a very
complex way of solving only one small part of the design problem, and therefore
went against the requirement for a simple method that was easily understandable.
Further work should also assess the relative eﬀectiveness of using particular measured
parameters in the diagnosis system; it can be seen from the graphs of fault simulations
that the displacement parameter, for example, seems to exhibit very few eﬀects
when faults are introduced. Few of the rules established by the system used values
from the displacement waveforms. The eﬀects were so small that they could not be
distinguished from random variations, and were rightly ignored by the system so
that it would not be confused by those variations.
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The system developed here has been presented to the INNOTRACK EU project
and may be taken forward by one of the industrial partners, a S&C1 manufacturer
with a condition monitoring product for their switches.
7.4 Eﬀectiveness of the system
The system performs markedly worse in case study II, when compared to case study
I. It highlights the weak point of the design, which is that a raw diﬀerence, obtained
from a matching episode value, is used to calculate relative performance. This
method works better when, as in case study I, the magnitude of fault eﬀects is
similar between actuators. For train doors, this seems intuitively true, since each
door is of similar mass and each actuator is installed in similar conditions.
For switch actuators, however, the situation is very diﬀerent: the load the actuator
is moving may vary from switch to switch because it is proportional to the length
of the switch, and also may be aﬀected by such factors as cant.
This weak point is also demonstrated by both case studies, in that the membership
of faults calculated by the system does not reach 1 when the rules are being applied
from another actuator - the diﬀerences calculated simply do not synchronise well
enough for this to be the case.
Overall, however, the test results show that the system is capable of correctly
detecting and diagnosing rising trends in incipient faults, even as the fault is in an
early stage of development. It therefore has the potential to be part of an integrated
diagnostic system.
With some reﬁnements to the algorithms for episode matching and qualitative trend
detection, the system would become much more eﬀective and reliable. One desirable
improvement would be to develop a way to spot qualitative trends, at the correct
1Switches and crossings
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dynamic scale, without performing any ﬁltering on the waveform at all. This may
require sophisticated pattern recognition systems such as neural networks, but the
need to keep the system simple should be considered when such reﬁnements are
considered.
After improvement, this system would be capable of achieving very accurate fault
predictions. Once experience has been gained of exactly how quickly the faults
develop naturally, it will be a trivial matter to start predicting the time to failure in
the presence of a particular fault, allowing true condition-based maintenance to be
achieved. Maintainers could perform their tasks reactively instead of periodically
- and with accurate condition monitoring, ensuring no faults are missed in the
prediction system, this would save money, time and risk to staﬀ. It is also possible
that if maintainers are able to take ownership of the system's data and outputs,
they may gain a deeper understanding of the behaviour of the assets they maintain,
making them more likely to make good decisions in maintenance.
7.5 Final words
A systematic, requirements-driven process was used to form a design for this fault
diagnosis system. By drawing on inspiration from several areas of the fault diagnosis
research base, it was possible to design a system which used existing approaches in
novel ways. This has resulted in a refreshing and new approach to the problem of
condition monitoring, and promises much for the future.
Although there is work to be done if this system is to be used in practice, it is
gratifying to consider that the concept is valid. If implementation is achieved, it
may well save millions of pounds per year in maintenance costs, allowing the rail
industry to reinvest that money in improvements for passengers and customers.
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Appendix A
Details of the design process
This section describes in detail the process which was carried out in order to arrive
at the ﬁnal design.
Initially, a set of requirements was developed, covering all aspects of the design
problem, including consideration of the application environment. This requirements
set was derived from the initial brief of the thesis, as shown in ﬁgure A.1.
Published 
literature
Published 
literature
Project 
concept 
specification
System level 
requirements 
specification
1.1
Extract system and 
project requirements
Published 
literature
1.2
Increase understanding 
of relevant current 
research
Formal notes
Input documents Output documentsTasks
University and 
EPSRC 
doctoral 
regulations
Figure A.1: Phase I of the thesis - initial requirements deﬁnition
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The function of the system was deﬁned such that all the requirements are met.
The requirements and functions were reﬁned to progressively ﬁner levels of detail
by evaluating options, choosing a solution and recording the decision as a new set
of requirements which apply to the next level of functionality. A system may be
deﬁned functionally in several ways; the optimum method is chosen by evaluating
the predicted performance of the functions against the requirements. The best
performing functional deﬁnition was chosen. Figure A.2 shows the ﬂow of this
design stage.
Once this process was complete, components were chosen to fulﬁl the functions of the
system. Again, the components were evaluated against the requirements to ensure
that the process arrived at the best possible solution. Speciﬁcations were made for
the correct integration of components, to ensure that interfaces work correctly.
Requirements, functions and components were reﬁned several times, resulting in
the deﬁnition of progressively ﬁner details of the system. When all components had
been deﬁned, implementation could take place. The components were constructed
according to their requirements. Then they were connected together to form the
physical system. Integration tests are carried out to ensure that all interfaces work
correctly. Figure A.3 shows the process of physical design and implementation as it
applies to this thesis, which is mostly implemented in software.
Phase IV was the ﬁnal phase of this systems engineering process, because the
theoretical implementation is the ﬁnal deliverable of the thesis. During this phase,
the system was tested against artiﬁcial data (allowing changes to be made if necessary)
before using real data to formally test the system. The system was checked against
its functional design to ensure it conformed to the functional ﬂow speciﬁed. The
performance of the system was then checked against the requirements to ensure that
all requirements were fulﬁlled. It is then fair to conclude that the design problem is
solved and that the system works as required. Figure A.4 shows this testing process.
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Figure A.2: Phase II of the thesis - detailed system deﬁnition
Documentation was maintained throughout this process in order to keep track of
design decisions. Changes to the system were controlled and recorded to ensure that
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3 IMPLEMENTATION
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Figure A.3: Phase III of the thesis - implementation
they did not interfere with any requirements.
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Figure A.4: Phase IV of the thesis - testing and veriﬁcation
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Appendix B
Conventions for mathematical
notation
B.1 Subscripts
Subscripts for symbols shall indicate either an index value within a vector or matrix,
or some sort of qualiﬁcation to the symbol. The convention shall be that qualiﬁcation
symbols shall be in unenclosed text, and indices shall be enclosed within brackets
even if only one index is displayed where more than one might be displayed.
Where a symbol has a subscript indicating that it is a numbered element of a
matrix, the coordinates shall be written in triangular brackets. Subscripts to matrix
or vector symbols shall be enclosed in parentheses. An example of the indexing
convention is shown below:
A =
⎡⎢⎣ 푎⟨1,1⟩ 푎⟨1,2⟩
푎⟨2,1⟩ 푎⟨2,2⟩
⎤⎥⎦ (B.1)
A(1,1) = 푎⟨1,1⟩ (B.2)
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B.2 Columns and rows of matrices
Let
A =
⎡⎢⎣ 푎⟨1,1⟩ 푎⟨1,2⟩
푎⟨2,1⟩ 푎⟨2,2⟩
⎤⎥⎦ (B.3)
Sometimes it is necessary to isolate a column or row fromA for a separate operation.
If an operation were to be carried out on the vector formed by the ﬁrst column of
A, this portion of the matrix shall be written thus:
A(:,1) =
⎡⎢⎣ 푎⟨1,1⟩
푎⟨2,1⟩
⎤⎥⎦ (B.4)
The colon represents all values along a particular dimension, between two limits. If
no limits are displayed, as in the above example, this means that all elements along
that dimension are included. For example, if there were a 10 × 10 matrix B, the
notation B(2:5,1) would represent a column vector containing elements 2 to 5 of the
ﬁrst column of B.
This notation has been chosen because these functions are to be implemented in
MATLAB, and this form of notation is analogous to the indexing notation used in
MATLAB code.
B.3 Element-wise operation
Most of the functions in the following sections operate element-wise on vectors
extracted, using the method in the previous section, from larger matrices. An
element-wise operation shall be denoted by a circumﬂex accent (ˆ) on top of the
normal operator or, in function notation, the parentheses containing the operand.
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For example:
Element-wise multiplication c = aˆ.b (B.5)
Element-wise function c = 푓ˆ (x) (B.6)
B.4 Dimension notation
In order to avoid confusion, counter symbols are deﬁned in table B.1 for consistent
use throughout this document. This should establish ﬁrmly which dimension is
being dealt with at any one time. When ﬁgures replace counters in subscripts, they
will always be listed in the order shown, whether or not all dimensions are used.
Symbol Dimension
푖 Fault number
푗 Measurement repetitions
푘 Time (sample number, interval number or episode number)
푙 Measured variable number
푚 Element of membership function vector
Table B.1: Table of dimension notations
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Appendix C
Result graphs for case study I
(pneumatic train door actuator)
This section displays the results graphs for all 12 of the possible actuator combinations.
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Figure C.1: Results graphs for opening operations, A door as test actuator and B
as monitored actuator
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Figure C.2: Results graphs for closing operations, A door as test actuator and B as
monitored actuator
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Figure C.3: Results graphs for opening operations, A door as test actuator and C
as monitored actuator
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Figure C.4: Results graphs for closing operations, A door as test actuator and C as
monitored actuator
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Figure C.5: Results graphs for opening operations, A door as test actuator and D
as monitored actuator
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Figure C.6: Results graphs for closing operations, A door as test actuator and D as
monitored actuator
Page 159 of 189
2 4 6 8 10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Operations
S i
m
:  F
F
 
F a
u l
t  s
t r e
n g
t h
FF Diag
2 4 6 8 10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Operations
OCL Diag
2 4 6 8 10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Operations
OCS Diag
4.5 5 5.5 6
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
OC pressure (bar)
S i
m
:  O
C L
 
F a
u l
t  s
t r e
n g
t h
4.5 5 5.5 6
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
OC pressure (bar)
4.5 5 5.5 6
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
OC pressure (bar)
1234
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
OC pressure (bar)
S i
m
:  O
C S
 
F a
u l
t  s
t r e
n g
t h
1234
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
OC pressure (bar)
1234
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
OC pressure (bar)
Figure C.7: Results graphs for opening operations, B door as test actuator and A
as monitored actuator
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Figure C.8: Results graphs for closing operations, B door as test actuator and A as
monitored actuator
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Figure C.9: Results graphs for opening operations, B door as test actuator and C
as monitored actuator
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Figure C.10: Results graphs for closing operations, B door as test actuator and C
as monitored actuator
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Figure C.11: Results graphs for opening operations, B door as test actuator and D
as monitored actuator
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Figure C.12: Results graphs for closing operations, B door as test actuator and D
as monitored actuator
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Figure C.13: Results graphs for opening operations, C door as test actuator and A
as monitored actuator
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Figure C.14: Results graphs for closing operations, C door as test actuator and A
as monitored actuator
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Figure C.15: Results graphs for opening operations, C door as test actuator and B
as monitored actuator
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Figure C.16: Results graphs for closing operations, C door as test actuator and B
as monitored actuator
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Figure C.17: Results graphs for opening operations, C door as test actuator and D
as monitored actuator
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Figure C.18: Results graphs for closing operations, C door as test actuator and D
as monitored actuator
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Figure C.19: Results graphs for opening operations, D door as test actuator and A
as monitored actuator
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Figure C.20: Results graphs for closing operations, D door as test actuator and A
as monitored actuator
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Figure C.21: Results graphs for opening operations, D door as test actuator and B
as monitored actuator
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Figure C.22: Results graphs for closing operations, D door as test actuator and B
as monitored actuator
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Figure C.23: Results graphs for opening operations, D door as test actuator and C
as monitored actuator
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Figure C.24: Results graphs for closing operations, D door as test actuator and C
as monitored actuator
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Appendix D
Result graphs for case study II (DC
electric switch actuator)
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Figure D.1: Results graphs for normal to reverse operations, switch A as test
actuator and switch B as monitored actuator
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Figure D.2: Results graphs for reverse to normal operations, switch A as test
actuator and switch B as monitored actuator
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Figure D.3: Results graphs for normal to reverse operations, switch A as test
actuator and switch C as monitored actuator
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Figure D.4: Results graphs for reverse to normal operations, switch A as test
actuator and switch C as monitored actuator
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Figure D.5: Results graphs for normal to reverse operations, switch B as test
actuator and switch A as monitored actuator
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Figure D.6: Results graphs for reverse to normal operations, switch B as test
actuator and switch A as monitored actuator
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Figure D.7: Results graphs for normal to reverse operations, switch B as test
actuator and switch C as monitored actuator
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Figure D.8: Results graphs for reverse to normal operations, switch B as test
actuator and switch C as monitored actuator
Page 185 of 189
2 4 6 8 10
0
0.5
1
Operations
S i
m
:  F
F
 
F a
u l
t  s
t r e
n g
t h
FF Diag
2 4 6 8 10
0
0.5
1
Operations
ODN Diag
2 4 6 8 10
0
0.5
1
Operations
ODR Diag
2 4 6 8 10
0
0.5
1
Operations
BDOD Diag
2 4 6 8 10
0
0.5
1
Operations
BDUD Diag
0 5 10
0
0.5
1
Adjustments in 1 / 6 turns
S i
m
:  O
D N
 
F a
u l
t  s
t r e
n g
t h
0 5 10
0
0.5
1
Adjustments in 1 / 6 turns
0 5 10
0
0.5
1
Adjustments in 1 / 6 turns
0 5 10
0
0.5
1
Adjustments in 1 / 6 turns
0 5 10
0
0.5
1
Adjustments in 1 / 6 turns
0 5 10
0
0.5
1
Adjustments in 1 / 6 turns
S i
m
:  O
D R
 
F a
u l
t  s
t r e
n g
t h
0 5 10
0
0.5
1
Adjustments in 1 / 6 turns
0 5 10
0
0.5
1
Adjustments in 1 / 6 turns
0 5 10
0
0.5
1
Adjustments in 1 / 6 turns
0 5 10
0
0.5
1
Adjustments in 1 / 6 turns
0 20 40 60
0
0.5
1
Adjustments in mm
S i
m
:  B
D O
D
 
F a
u l
t  s
t r e
n g
t h
0 20 40 60
0
0.5
1
Adjustments in mm
0 20 40 60
0
0.5
1
Adjustments in mm
0 20 40 60
0
0.5
1
Adjustments in mm
0 20 40 60
0
0.5
1
Adjustments in mm
0 50 100
0
0.5
1
Adjustments in mm
S i
m
:  B
D U
D
 
F a
u l
t  s
t r e
n g
t h
0 50 100
0
0.5
1
Adjustments in mm
0 50 100
0
0.5
1
Adjustments in mm
0 50 100
0
0.5
1
Adjustments in mm
0 50 100
0
0.5
1
Adjustments in mm
Figure D.9: Results graphs for normal to reverse operations, switch C as test
actuator and switch A as monitored actuator
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Figure D.10: Results graphs for reverse to normal operations, switch C as test
actuator and switch A as monitored actuator
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Figure D.11: Results graphs for normal to reverse operations, switch C as test
actuator and switch B as monitored actuator
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Figure D.12: Results graphs for reverse to normal operations, switch C as test
actuator and switch B as monitored actuator
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